It’s 1996 and Greece is on a collision course with Turkey over a cluster of islets within the jap Aegean. Twenty-seven years later, one of many protagonists of the Imia disaster, the common commander of the realm and captain of the Navarinon frigate, retired vice admiral Ioannis Lioulis, speaks about occasions which have by no means been made public earlier than, in an unique interview with Kathimerini.
Having had command of the Hellenic Navy fleet, he provides an in depth account of the developments that led to the demise of officers Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos and Ektoras Gialopsos in a helicopter crash that has left a long-lasting mark on the morale of the Armed Forces.
The place was the Navarinon when the disaster started and what have been your orders?
It was on train. I used to be instructed on January 30 – it was a Tuesday – to sail to the realm and manage the ships, as a result of there have been some small gunners and patrol boats there that have been used primarily for analysis and patrols. My orders have been to safe the realm, however I used to be not instructed to organize for something specifically. I used to be ordered to go to Astypalaia on the earlier Monday afternoon and from there to sail as quickly as doable to the realm, because the disaster had began escalating.
What was the order of battle you got and what have been the Turkish forces doing at that second?
After I acquired to the realm, there have been – if I bear in mind accurately – two gunners, two assault missile boats and the ships Panagopoulos and Antoniou. I sensed the strain without delay and acquired the impression that there was a disaster within the strategy of escalation. I began pondering that we would have liked to be ready to cope with any scenario, so I positioned the ships in such a approach that each one the models can be lined. I’ve to emphasize the chance there was of operating aground as we have been very near the coast. The Navarinon is a giant ship and it was very close to Kalolimnos.
So many of the ships have been positioned for canopy, besides those that have been near Imia, observing the Turkish ships. After we say “cowl,” we imply that they have been near the coast and couldn’t be simply positioned by radar or hit by missiles. I had additionally instructed every Greek unit which explicit Turkish ship to maintain beneath surveillance in order that we might be able to act the second the political management and the army management made such a choice.
Guidelines of engagement
Admiral Christos Lymberis gave you the inexperienced mild to behave at 10.25 a.m. on January 29, whereas at 2.11 a.m. on January 31, one other related communication got here by way of to the Navarinon.
No guidelines of engagement have been issued in writing to any Greek ship at any level in the course of the interval that the Navarinon was within the neighborhood of Imia – from the morning of January 30 once we arrived till the de-escalation. I need to stress that the foundations of engagement are a algorithm that decide the ships’ actions throughout an operation and through a disaster. When the explanations are very severe, these are decided by the Council for Overseas Affairs and Protection (KYSEA) and they’re what escalates a disaster to the purpose of hostilities or de-escalates it. Warfare is just not determined by the army management, however by the political management. That is how the Greek disaster administration system is structured, as is the case in most nations. KYSEA didn’t draft any guidelines of engagement in order that the Greek models might know what was anticipated by way of escalation, engagement and de-escalation. The consequence was that there was confusion and misunderstandings concerning the desired course of the disaster.
Warfare is just not determined by the army management, however by the political management. That is how the Greek disaster administration system is structured, as is the case in most nations
We later discovered that the political management had already made the choice and brought motion towards disengagement on Tuesday, January 30. In Imia, although, the actions of the Turks at that second escalated the disaster and seemed that we have been heading towards an excellent better escalation. So, whereas the disaster was rising domestically, the political management was transferring in the other way.
Round 1.30-2 a.m. when the disaster began peaking, the Navy Basic Employees referred to as by way of orders that no Turkish foot ought to be allowed on step on the land and that within the occasion we noticed one thing, we should always fireplace a flare, warning photographs after which assault. It was a common rule. Now, if a Turkish frigate sailed into Greek territorial waters – which occurred always – or their helicopters have been in our airspace, did I’ve a proper to assault?
There was this confusion, you see. On the one hand, the politicians have been working towards a de-escalation and, as I perceive it, had not knowledgeable the army management, whereas on the opposite, we had a disaster in Imia that was always escalating. The impression was that issues have been very severe certainly and we had ready our ships for each eventuality. Whenever you need to launch a guided missile, you don’t simply press a button and it goes. It’s a must to do all kinds of preparation that lets you act when it turns into needed.
How shut did Greece come to battle with Turkey that evening?
What I can say is that the ships which have been there fortunately handled the scenario calmly and significantly. As a result of one mistaken transfer, or one unclear transfer, might have sparked an incident. Everybody on the ships was calm, conscious, cautious and ready. We had the operational benefit and if the political management wished to have interaction in hostilities first and gave us the order, the Turkish models would have been dealt a severe blow.
As soon as the disaster was over and also you have been invited again to Athens, who did you see and what was mentioned?
All the commanders of the ships in Imia on the time gathered in a room on the Ministry of Protection to fulfill with the minister and deputy minister of protection, the heads of the Nationwide Protection Basic Employees and the Navy Employees and different officers. The minister wished to grasp what had occurred.
As an everyday commander within the space, what errors do you suppose have been made?
The principles of engagement was the most important one from an operational perspective, however this was not a difficulty with the army management, however the political one. The Nationwide Safety Council was by no means convened and it’s KYSEA that’s chargeable for drafting the foundations of engagement. The army management has the correct to subject sure different guidelines of engagement. Sure operational errors have been made, however they didn’t have an effect on the disaster.
Do you imagine the political management on the time was capable of cope with such an incident?
It is very important stress, as a lesson if you’ll, that each political management must have some primary understanding of how operations work and, most significantly, of disaster administration, in order that it could possibly successfully talk with the army management. Failure to totally perceive a scenario is just not conducive to the profitable end result of a disaster, for starters. Then there’s the failure to convene KYSEA, the failure to look at the operation because it unfolds from the right operation administration rooms and, fourthly, the failure to amass disaster administration know-how from the onset.
The lesson from this disaster, subsequently, is that each place of the political management should know how one can deal with a army disaster. Each authorities, each political management should even be cognizant of the procedures for shaping the nationwide army technique, which is outlined not by the army, however the political management.
The helicopter crash
On the matter of the helicopter crash, is it true that it ought to by no means have gone up within the situations that it did?
The climate could not have been good, however the situations have been fantastic for flying and the inexperienced mild was given for the helicopter. There was no communication from the helicopter regarding the suitability of the situations.
What have been your ideas when a misery sign was issued?
The helicopter took off for western Imia, circled the realm roughly 4 occasions to establish whether or not there was a Turkish unit on the island, positioned the unit and estimated that it comprised 10 folks. The grasp warning mild indicating a technical downside went on throughout its fifth circle. It was given permission to return and the Navarinon really left its place in order that the helicopter might land on its deck. We adopted the right process for a grasp warning, which isn’t essentially the most excessive of emergency indicators.
Is it true that the Turkish ship Yavuz had additionally given the helicopter a sign to land on its deck safely?
No. What occurred was this: We misplaced communication and the helicopter’s radar sign on its return flight after the grasp warning mild went on, so we activated the emergency community. The Yavuz, which can have been surveilling the community, tuned into the emergency frequency calling out to the helicopter, however the sign was already misplaced and the helicopter by no means responded. The Yavuz was clearly tuned in for different causes.
What do you suppose occurred to the helicopter? Was it a case of pilot vertigo or was it shot down?
We’ve got to be very cautious right here. I used to be listening to the community and there was no point out by the pilots of the helicopter being hit. Investigations of the helicopter after it was introduced up confirmed no proof of it having been hit by a bullet or another projectile.
The specialists additionally decided that the way in which it fell was not that of a helicopter that has been hit, however of 1 that instantly loses altitude and crashes. That’s the proof I do know of.
What I additionally know is that these three officers have been sacrificed on the altar of responsibility. They’re heroes, misplaced within the waters off Imia on January 31, 1996.
It has been 27 years because the Imia disaster. What has stayed with you?
Unhappiness for the lads who have been misplaced. They have been doing their responsibility, doing their job. The disaster resulted in a de-escalation and if the procedures had been carried out as they need to have been in that interval from January 25-30, the escalation and their sacrifice might have been prevented. That’s what saddens me.
The Armed Forces as we speak
Do you suppose that the Armed Forces as we speak are in a very good place to answer modern-day threats?
I imagine that our Armed Forces are at an excellent degree of operational preparedness. There are some issues with materiel and workers, however I believe that they’re nonetheless in a very good place to reply successfully to any disaster in these tough occasions of Greek-Turkish relations.
I believe that the folks in the important thing positions are high-caliber and capable of deal successfully with any disaster.
