Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Risk in Afghanistan


Introduction

Within the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of Taliban rule, the US is now contending with a resurgent terrorist risk. Each al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-Ok) are rising in energy and will pose a big risk past Afghanistan, in accordance [PDF] to current U.S. authorities estimates. As a current UN Safety Council evaluation concluded [PDF], “terrorist teams get pleasure from larger freedom in Afghanistan than at any time in current historical past.”


Seth Jones

Harold Brown Chair and Director, Transnational Threats Undertaking, Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research.

A 2020 CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, A Failed Afghan Peace Deal, warned {that a} U.S. navy withdrawal from the nation might lead to a collapsed peace course of and an overthrow of the Afghan authorities. It additionally argued that one of the vital penalties of a withdrawal could be a resurgence of terrorist teams. These issues have proved true. This replace assesses the evolving terrorist risk emanating from Afghanistan and the way greatest to counter it.

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Al-Qaeda

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Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Two components account for the rising terrorist risk in Afghanistan. First, the Taliban authorities has shut hyperlinks with a number of terrorist teams, together with al-Qaeda, and has allowed them to rebuild and reestablish coaching camps within the nation.

Second, Afghanistan is a weak and failing state, a prerequisite for a terrorist sanctuary. The Taliban doesn’t management regulation and order outdoors of most cities. As well as, the Taliban authorities has been unable to determine primary companies, and the Afghan financial system has shrunk by not less than 40 p.c for the reason that U.S. withdrawal. The poverty price might hit 97 p.c of the inhabitants by the center of this yr. Afghanistan has jumped to the highest of the Worldwide Rescue Committee’s 2022 Emergency Watchlist because it nears the collapse of just about all primary companies. The mixture of a weak state and a collapsing financial system offers terrorist teams relative freedom inside which to function and offers a pool of potential recruits.

With the terrorism downside worsening, the US must design and implement a simpler counterterrorism technique to mitigate this risk.

New Considerations

In August 2021, President Joe Biden remarked that the US’ “solely important nationwide curiosity in Afghanistan stays right this moment what it has all the time been: stopping a terrorist assault on [the] American homeland.” Because the U.S. withdrawal, nevertheless, the terrorist downside has grow to be steadily worse. In accordance with U.S. intelligence estimates, the variety of al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan has elevated since U.S. forces withdrew in August 2021. As one senior U.S. Division of Protection official concluded [PDF], “the intelligence neighborhood [assessed] that each ISIS-Ok and al-Qaeda have the intent to conduct exterior operations,” with ISIS-Ok able to conducting exterior assaults in 2022.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda’s main purpose stays the identical: to determine a pan-Islamic caliphate and overthrow the corrupt “apostate” regimes within the Islamic world. Led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda right this moment includes disparate networks across the globe with uneven centralized management. Its primary associates are positioned within the Center East, together with Hurras al-Din in Syria and al-Qaeda within the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; Africa, together with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin within the Sahel and al-Shabab in Somalia; and South Asia, together with al-Qaeda’s international management and native affiliate al-Qaeda within the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). In some international locations, similar to Yemen, al-Qaeda has been considerably weakened and seems to be on a declining trajectory by way of standard help and capabilities.

Extra on:

Afghanistan

Taliban

Al-Qaeda

Islamic State

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

However Afghanistan stays a central strategic node for al-Qaeda, the place the group now has a refuge. Along with al-Zawahiri, a number of different senior leaders possible reside in Afghanistan, together with Saif al-Adel and Amin Muhammad ul-Haq Saam Khan. AQIS is headquartered in Afghanistan and is led by Osama Mehmood and his deputy, Atif Yahya Ghouri. In early 2021, U.S. intelligence companies estimated [PDF] that al-Qaeda was the weakest it had been in years and included fewer than 200 members in Afghanistan. However now, al-Qaeda’s complete numbers in Afghanistan might have doubled to 4 hundred fighters [PDF], with most members coming from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

However Afghanistan stays a central strategic node for al-Qaeda, the place the group now has a refuge.

Afghanistan is totally different from another nation the place al-Qaeda operates as a result of the group enjoys a sympathetic regime with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda leaders have a very shut historic relationship with some Taliban leaders—similar to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban inside minister and a U.S.-designated terrorist. Haqqani’s authorities place is roughly equal to the mixed jobs of the director of the FBI and secretary of Homeland Safety, giving him huge energy in Afghanistan and making him a severe risk to the US.

With a haven in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s risk to U.S. pursuits is more likely to develop. Whereas al-Qaeda will in all probability set up extra terrorist coaching camps in Afghanistan, it can have problem conducting a centrally deliberate assault towards the U.S. homeland due to improved U.S. intelligence cooperation and homeland safety measures. However al-Qaeda operatives might conduct—or encourage—assaults towards U.S. and Western targets in Africa, Europe, the Center East, and South Asia.

ISIS-Ok

The self-proclaimed Islamic State’s native affiliate, ISIS-Ok, additionally presents a rising risk. Whereas ISIS-Ok is a sworn enemy of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, its purpose is much like that of al-Qaeda: to determine a pan-Islamic caliphate. ISIS-Ok was severely weakened by means of mid-2021 due to aggressive U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operations, Taliban offensives, and inside divisions inside ISIS-Ok. Nonetheless, the U.S. withdrawal has allowed the group to get better.

ISIS-Ok’s measurement has now doubled in lower than a yr, growing from two thousand to roughly 4 thousand operatives [PDF] following the discharge of a number of thousand prisoners from Bagram Air Base and Pul-e-Charkhi jail outdoors of Kabul. As much as half [PDF] of ISIS-Ok’s operatives are international fighters. The group is led by Sanaullah Ghafari (also called Shahab al-Muhajir), an Afghan nationwide. Different ISIS-Ok leaders embody Sultan Aziz Azam, Maulawi Rajab Salahudin, and Aslam Farooqi. As well as, some former members of the Afghan navy and Afghanistan’s intelligence company, the Nationwide Directorate for Safety, have joined ISIS-Ok as a result of it’s the most lively opposition group to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

ISIS-Ok’s measurement has now doubled in lower than a yr, growing from two thousand to roughly 4 thousand operatives.

Very like al-Qaeda, ISIS-Ok is unlikely to efficiently orchestrate a centrally deliberate assault in the US due to improved U.S. homeland safety measures, although ISIS-Ok has been extra profitable than al-Qaeda in inspiring assaults in the US. As well as, ISIS-Ok might conduct assaults towards U.S. targets in different international locations. In Afghanistan, ISIS-Ok has already demonstrated a capability to conduct high-profile and complicated assaults—together with an assault on the Kabul airport on August 27, 2021, which killed greater than 180 folks. In accordance with one estimate, ISIS-Ok carried out seventy-six assaults on Taliban forces between September 18 and November 30, 2021, a big bounce from 2020, when it carried out solely eight assaults throughout the complete yr.

Different Terrorist Teams

Along with al-Qaeda and ISIS-Ok, different regional and worldwide terrorist teams now function in Afghanistan. These embody the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Japanese Turkistan Islamic Motion, Islamic Jihad Group, Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, and Islamic Motion of Uzbekistan. A number of teams, similar to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, pose a big risk to India—a significant U.S. companion—and have carried out high-profile assaults in Mumbai, New Delhi, and different Indian cities. Extra broadly, the Taliban’s victory has impressed jihadis around the globe. Teams in Africa, Asia, the Center East, and elsewhere gleefully celebrated the Taliban’s conquest of Kabul on chat rooms and different on-line platforms, pledging the revitalization of a worldwide jihad. Al-Qaeda launched a press release after the U.S. withdrawal congratulating the Taliban for its victory and calling it a “prelude” to different jihadi victories.

Coverage Implications

Two primary U.S. coverage choices might assist forestall the reemergence of Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations towards the U.S. homeland and U.S. pursuits abroad.

The primary is to work with the Taliban towards some terrorist teams, most notably ISIS-Ok. This feature might contain offering financial and humanitarian help—and probably even intelligence—to the Taliban authorities in return for a sustained marketing campaign towards ISIS-Ok. When requested in 2021 whether or not the US might work with the Taliban to fight ISIS-Ok, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Workers Normal Mark Milley responded that “it’s potential.” A variant of this feature might be for the US to de facto depart counterterrorism operations to the Taliban—however present little or no U.S. help.

Nonetheless, this feature falls brief in not less than two methods. First, the Taliban has shut ties with quite a few terrorist teams in Afghanistan, together with al-Qaeda, which can be enemies of the US. Whereas the Taliban has carried out some operations towards ISIS-Ok, Taliban leaders have proven little curiosity in countering different terrorist teams. Consequently, this strategy might worsen the broader terrorism downside by aiding a authorities that helps terrorist teams. Second, the Taliban is unlikely to considerably weaken ISIS-Ok with or with out U.S. assist, as a result of it lacks the capabilities and management of territory. The Taliban’s Ministry of Inside and Normal Directorate of Intelligence have tried to higher synchronize [PDF] their efforts to fight ISIS-Ok’s operations in city areas, however ISIS-Ok has continued to extend the variety of its assaults in Afghanistan.

Doing nothing, and hoping that the Taliban turns into simpler, can also be problematic. Because the commander of U.S. Central Command famous [PDF], “ISIS-Ok could acquire energy and be emboldened to increase its operations and goal neighboring international locations” absent sustained U.S. strain.

A second coverage choice is to conduct a sturdy “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism marketing campaign, which makes use of aerial platforms and satellites to gather alerts intelligence and imagery intelligence on terrorist exercise. America can even conduct strikes from fixed-wing plane and unmanned aerial automobiles (UAVs), such because the MQ-9A Reaper. These platforms and methods might be used to observe terrorist teams and periodically strike targets to degrade terrorist capabilities and disrupt operations.

In distinction to just about each different U.S. counterterrorism marketing campaign since 9/11, the US has no companion power on the bottom in Afghanistan.

U.S. officers have contended that implementing an over-the-horizon technique is a viable choice, as it will require the deployment of fewer navy forces, decrease casualties, lower the monetary prices of a big navy deployment, and cut back political dangers. Nationwide Safety Advisor Jake Sullivan argued that the US has demonstrated the feasibility of an over-the-horizon technique in different international locations:

Now we have to cope with the specter of terrorism in Yemen and Somalia and Syria. Now we have to cope with the specter of terrorism throughout the Islamic Maghreb. . . . And what we now have proven is, in most of the international locations I simply talked about, amongst others, we now have been profitable up to now in suppressing the terrorist risk to the U.S. homeland in these international locations with out sustaining a everlasting navy presence or combating in a struggle. And that’s what we intend to do with respect to Afghanistan as effectively.

Nonetheless, the counterterrorism campaigns Sullivan mentions differ from the scenario in Afghanistan right this moment in three crucial methods.  First, in distinction to just about each different U.S. counterterrorism marketing campaign since 9/11, the US has no companion power on the bottom in Afghanistan. America labored with the Iraqi authorities, together with the U.S.-trained and geared up Counter Terrorism Service, in Iraq; native safety forces, such because the Libyan Nationwide Army, in Libya; the Somali authorities, African Union Mission in Somalia forces, and clan militias in Somalia; the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria; and militias aided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen. In Afghanistan right this moment, nevertheless, the Taliban is an enemy, and anti-Taliban leaders and teams have fled the nation, been killed by the Taliban, laid down their weapons, and even joined ISIS-Ok.

Second, the US has just about no intelligence structure in Afghanistan. America shut down its embassy and CIA station when it withdrew navy forces in August 2021. U.S. navy intelligence organizations—such because the Protection Intelligence Company and Nationwide Safety Company—additionally withdrew most of their intelligence assortment capabilities. As the top of U.S. Central Command acknowledged in December 2021, “we’re in all probability at about 1 or 2 p.c of the capabilities we as soon as needed to look into Afghanistan,” making it “very laborious” to grasp what is occurring there.

Third, the US has no bases within the area to fly plane for intelligence assortment or strike missions. America withdrew from all bases in Afghanistan, similar to Bagram Air Base and Kandahar Worldwide Airport, and doesn’t have bases in Central Asia or South Asia. As an alternative, the US has been pressured to make the most of areas similar to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is roughly 2,500 miles from Kabul (assuming Pakistan permits U.S. plane overflight rights). It takes an MQ-9A roughly fourteen hours to fly round-trip, leaving it restricted time in Afghanistan earlier than returning to Qatar. America might additionally launch UAVs or cruise missiles from vessels within the Indian Ocean, although these ships and platforms might be wanted to counter Chinese language exercise within the Indo-Pacific area.

The shortage of companion forces, scant intelligence, and no close by bases leaves the US severely hamstrung in conducting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The failed U.S. drone strike in Kabul towards a supposed ISIS-Ok goal on August 29, 2021, was a very good instance of the US’ present counterterrorism challenges. Whereas President Biden and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Normal Mark Milley initially lauded the assault as a textbook instance of over-the-horizon capabilities, it was in actual fact a failure: the U.S. Division of Protection ultimately acknowledged that the strike was a horrific mistake that killed ten Afghan civilians, together with seven youngsters, moderately than ISIS-Ok members.

Suggestions

One of the best U.S. choice is to conduct a sturdy over-the-horizon counterterrorism marketing campaign, so long as the US first addresses the challenges it faces in accumulating intelligence and orchestrating efficient operations. This marketing campaign ought to have three parts.

First, the US ought to work with native forces inside and outdoors Afghanistan to rebuild the US’ intelligence structure in Afghanistan towards terrorist teams. The U.S. navy and CIA have an extended historical past of working with native Afghan forces—together with Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, and a few Pashtun militias—to gather intelligence and conduct counterterrorism operations. Some U.S. actions have been orchestrated as covert motion applications below Title 50 of U.S. Code, which permits the US to conduct political, financial, and navy actions overseas that aren’t acknowledged publicly. Throughout the Nineteen Nineties, for instance, the CIA offered covert funding and gear to anti-Taliban teams, such because the Northern Alliance.

The primary purpose shouldn’t be to overthrow the Taliban, however to gather intelligence on terrorist teams and people working in Afghanistan.

The Biden administration’s withdrawal of U.S. navy forces doesn’t preclude the US from utilizing CIA paramilitary items from the Particular Actions Heart or U.S. particular operations forces working below Title 50 authority to work with forces in Afghanistan and close by international locations. The primary purpose ought to not be to overthrow the Taliban regime, however moderately to gather intelligence on terrorist teams and people working in Afghanistan. America doesn’t have to deploy CIA or particular forces to Afghanistan, not less than on a routine foundation. As an alternative, U.S. companies can work with Afghan companions outdoors of the nation.

These U.S. companions—which might vary from supporters of the Nationwide Resistance Entrance to anti-Taliban Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and different networks—can present helpful data on terrorist leaders, coaching camps, and different actions, which the US ought to complement with intelligence collected from different sources. America can leverage such people as Ahmad Massoud, Amrullah Saleh, Bismullah Khan Mohammadi, and Ali Nazary, in addition to their networks. As well as, there may be deep opposition to the Taliban amongst some Pashtun tribes and subtribes, similar to Barakzais and Popalzais, that U.S. intelligence and navy items might leverage.

Intelligence from U.S. companions on the bottom in Afghanistan is crucial for “tipping and cueing,” the method of monitoring an space or particular goal of curiosity by a sensor. If there may be proof of terrorist exercise, U.S. intelligence operatives can request “tipping” from one other complementary sensor platform—similar to an MQ-9—to amass “cueing,” a picture over the identical space. Efficient human intelligence on the bottom is crucial for this course of to make sure correct data on the placement and actions of a terrorist goal. The tip-and-cue course of permits the US to construct an intelligence image, which it then makes use of to conduct an motion—similar to a strike—towards the goal. With out companions on the bottom, nevertheless, U.S. intelligence is basically blind.

Second, the US ought to negotiate basing entry within the area, particularly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. America ought to jumpstart negotiations with international locations within the area—similar to Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and presumably even India—to deal with manned and unmanned plane to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over Afghan territory.

The Biden Administration has began these discussions, however they are going to be troublesome. Permitting the U.S. navy or intelligence neighborhood to fly strike plane—and strike missions—might be too politically dangerous for a lot of of those governments. As well as, Russia has already voiced robust opposition to U.S. bases in Central Asia. Washington’s escalating tensions with Moscow over the struggle in Ukraine and broader geostrategic competitors will make negotiations troublesome. Surveillance plane might be extra politically palatable for some international locations.

Third, the US ought to increase its over-the-horizon capabilities. Given the mission necessities for Afghanistan, the most effective plane for the job is the unmanned MQ-9 due to its vary, sensor bundle, and strike functionality. Nonetheless, the US has primarily bought the MQ-9A Reaper variant. It takes a Reaper roughly fourteen hours to fly round-trip from Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar to Afghanistan, giving it solely twelve to fifteen hours to gather intelligence and strike targets if crucial.

The MQ-9B SkyGuardian would permit the US to fly not less than fifteen extra hours over Afghanistan with a bigger payload. America might complement its UAVs with manned plane—together with F-15E strike fighters, F-16 fighter bombers, A-10 floor assault jets, and B-52 strategic bombers—to conduct strikes. Because the Taliban don’t possess vital surface-to-air missile capabilities or an air power, the US would proceed to get pleasure from air superiority.

A U.S. failure to considerably enhance its counterterrorism capabilities and posture—notably by establishing relations with native companions, rebuilding an intelligence structure, and negotiating extra bases—will put the US and its companions at rising threat of a terrorist assault. U.S. intelligence companies now assess that al-Qaeda and ISIS-Ok might develop exterior operations capabilities as early as 2022. This actuality makes it vital for the US to maneuver expeditiously and undertake a simpler counterterrorism marketing campaign earlier than the following assault.



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