Regardless of shedding its leaders because of U.S. Special Forces “decapitation” strikes over the previous three years, the Islamic State however has markedly bolstered its ideological attraction within the jihadi world by efficiently leveraging the Islamic doctrine of Martyrdom (Shaheed) and the IS third world pledge (Bay’ah) marketing campaign. Certainly, there’s a paradoxical state of affairs: with the frequent focused killings of ISIS caliphs, the recruitment of native followers has noticeably elevated and the “breakout capability” of IS branches has strengthened in Central Asia (ISKP), Central Africa (ISCAP) and West Africa (ISWAP).
The previous three years have been wealthy in occasions within the historical past of the Islamic State throughout which its Shura Council proclaimed its leaders because the “Amir al-Mu’minin” (Amir of the Devoted) 4 instances. The story started on October 26, 2019, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the primary caliph of ISIS, blew himself up throughout a U.S. particular forces raid on his compound within the Syrian province of Idlib. Three days after, the Islamic State’s al-Furqan Media launched a prolonged speech from its spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, during which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was glorified because the “God-fearing Amir al-Mu’mineen and Caliph of the Muslims sacrificing himself on the trail of Allah.” In accordance with al-Furqan Media, “God Almighty decided for him to be killed in His path, and he was steadfast on his faith, going forth and never turning again in flight.” The IS official spokesman additionally introduced the appointment of a sure Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (a.ok.a. Haji Abdullah Qardash or Abu Ibrahim) as the brand new “commander of the believers and Caliph of the Muslims.”
Sixteen months later, on February 3, 2022, IS chief Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in a U.S. counterterrorism raid in Idlib province in northwestern Syria. In accordance with the U.S. Division of Protection, IS’ second caliph killed himself and members of his household by triggering an explosive system to keep away from seize throughout a raid by the U.S. Joint Particular Operations Command. The group’s spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir in his speech in al-Furqan Media eulogized IS’ second chief because the “Mujahid, Sheikh, worshipping Caliph, Amir al-Mu’mineen and nice chief who gave his life for Allah.”
On March 10, 2022, after a month of mourning for Abu Ibrahim, as is customary in Islam, the ISIS high Shura named Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Abu al-Hassan) because the third caliph and the “Amir al-Muminin” (“Emir of the Devoted”). His reign lasted solely eight months, the shortest interval within the historical past of the Islamic State. On November 30, 2022, IS spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir introduced that Islamic State chief Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi had been killed within the battle with out revealing any particular particulars. Hours after the announcement, CENTCOM confirmed his killing, including that it had occurred in Daraa province, in southern Syria, in mid-October by the hands of “the Free Syrian Army” (FSA).
Thus, IS caliph Abu al-Hassan was killed in an operation with out U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, IS spokesman al-Muhajir described the slain caliph Abu al-Hassan as “God’s soldier who fought within the path of Allah and sacrificed his life and properties with a view to achieve Paradise,” quoting the Quranic surah of “At-Tawba”. Additional, al-Muhajir additionally introduced that the IS Shura Council named Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (Abu al-Hussein), an unknown determine within the jihadi world, the brand new (fourth) caliph of the Islamic State.
A Untimely Celebration of ISIS Collapse
Following the good U.S. counterterror operations ensuing within the focused killing of ISIS and al-Qaeda leaders, Western society harbored extreme hopes for the accelerated collapse of the infamous transnational Salafi-Jihadi terrorist teams. This information grew to become the principle occasion on a worldwide scale and the engine of home political processes. The focused killing of ISIS’ first caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, was triumphantly introduced personally by former President Donald Trump, saying, “At my route, as commander-in-chief of the U.S., we obliterated ISIS caliphate, 100%.” Following this custom, on February 3, 2022, President Biden launched a transient assertion after which delivered remarks to the American individuals on how U.S. forces efficiently carried out a counterterror operation that resulted within the focused killing of second IS chief Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi in northwest Syria.
Nevertheless, the bitter reality is that the Islamic State’s demise, foretold after the focusing on killing of its leaders, has usually been untimely. The focused killings of the Islamic State’s founder, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in October 2019 and his successors, Abu Ibrahim and Abu al-Hasan, in 2022 additionally didn’t hasten the collapse of the motion by “100%”. Quite the opposite, the Islamic State and its native branches (provinces) have proven a cussed wrestle for ideological revival and peculiar survivability throughout the management transition.
Undoubtedly, focused killings or “decapitation strikes” in opposition to leaders of ISIS and al-Qaeda are essential in U.S. counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the ideological revival of the Islamic State and the elevated fight functionality of its native provinces (wilayats) once more elevate questions in regards to the impacts and effectiveness of counterterrorism methods that focus on transnational Salafi-Jihadi terrorist teams. Evaluation of ISIS actions over the previous three years has revealed that its media strategists have efficiently exploited focused killings of its caliphs and frequent management transitions to encourage assist and loyalty amongst associates all over the world.
After a sequence of losses of its leaders, the Islamic State is selling narratives that the IS caliphs are strange Mujahideen and easy warriors of Allah, preventing in opposition to the enemy of Islam. In accordance with the pro-IS Salafi students, the demise of the Caliph doesn’t result in the decline of the Caliphate, however solely ignites hope for the irreversible victory of the Islamic Ummah. Creating this notion, the Islamic State’s al-Naba Media claims that the Caliph isn’t a king who doesn’t go away his throne, surrounded by servants and courtiers who come and go along with every kind of pleasures. “The truth is, the caliphs wage jihad and willingly settle for demise within the path of Allah, simply because the Rashidun caliphs Omar was killed with a dagger, Uthman was lower with swords, and ‘Ali was struck with a sword. In the identical manner, IS’s final three caliphs have been killed, their physique components scattered in protection of the faith.” Such a story of the late three IS caliphs serves as an ideological stimulant for IS supporters.
ISIS not solely survived the focused killings of its leaders, however it continued to regroup and turn into extra of a menace with the expansion of its exterior “provinces” (wilayat) in Afghanistan and Pakistan (ISKP), Nigeria (ISWAP), Mozambique (ISCAP), Sinai Peninsula (ISSP) and Philippines (ISEAP). The Islamic State seeks to compensate for the lack of its “territorial caliphate” and the frequent focused killings of its leaders by spreading violent Salafi ideology to maintain its world venture thriving. As long as IS thrives in its exterior provinces, the dream of the worldwide caliphate stays alive.
The Islamic State’s Third Bay’ah Marketing campaign
A very powerful ISIS tactic in its management transition is its world Bay’ah (pledges of allegiance) marketing campaign to the brand new Caliph indicating a persistent world jihadist menace. On November 30, 2022, in line with its ideological technique, the Islamic State launched a brand new world bay’ah marketing campaign to its fourth caliph, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi. Since then, from December till now, heavy pledges of allegiance to ISIS’ new chief have been flooding in from its provinces throughout the Center East, Africa, and Central and South Asia.
To be extra exact, fifteen IS associates and pro-IS teams have already pledged allegiance to the brand new caliph: Iraq and Syria (IS-Iraq and al-Sham), IS-Yemen Province, Afghanistan and post-Soviet Central Asia (ISKP), West Africa (ISWAP), Central Africa (ISCAP), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (IS-DRC), IS-Sahel Province (ISGS), IS-Mozambique (IS-M), IS-Libya Province, IS-Somalia Province, Philippines (ISEAP), Pakistan (ISPP), India (ISHP), IS-Sinai Province, IS-Caucasus Province. In accordance with SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks jihadi media, ISIS operatives and supporters from not less than 30 international locations have rushed headlong into the Islamic State’s bay’ah marketing campaign. Not surprisingly, the Islamic State’s bay’ah marketing campaign remains to be within the headlines of jihadi social media retailers profusely publishing photographs and movies of IS militants pledging allegiance to the brand new so-called “Amir al-Muminin”.
Undoubtedly, the Islamic State’s theatrical bay’ah marketing campaign is ideologically inspiring its native provinces, hardline Takfiri outfits and pro-IS Salafi jihadists all over the world cementing their loyalty to the Caliphate as a proto-state venture. IS ideologues used photographs and movies from the Islamic State’s third world pledge marketing campaign to show the group’s steadfastness after the focused killing of its caliph. The Islamic State’s bay’ah marketing campaign additionally supplies a possibility for IS-Central to claim to present and future provinces that it’s a unified and increasing world Caliphate.
Are ISIS’ Caliphs Actually Martyrs?
In response to the focused killing of its leaders, Islamic State’s official speaker by means of the group’s media arms, normally al-Hayat Media Heart and al-Furqan Media, glorify its fallen leaders emphasizing the sacred significance of martyrs (Shaheed). Additional, IS’ spokesperson referred to as on the Caliphate warriors to avenge the focused killings of late IS leaders with a view to exaggerate the power and cohesion of the group.
After focused killings of its leaders, IS strategists wrestle to revive the Islamic State’s harsh Salafi-Jihadi ideology (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) by means of the Islamic doctrinal idea of Shaheed (martyrdom), to which jihadi insurgents are firmly dedicated. The cult of Shaheed contributes to turning the late IS leaders killed in focused assaults right into a topic of ideological inspiration.
In official statements in regards to the focused killings of its caliphs, IS claimed that all of them martyred on the jihadi battlefield whereas preventing the enemies of Islam. IS ideologists search to use the parable of shaheed to steer by instance, energize their followers and recruit new supporters. The IS propaganda machine manipulated the Shaheed idea to swimsuit its wants. Though the time period shaheed within the Qur’an refers solely to a authorized or eyewitness, trendy Salafi-Jihadi ideologies exploit it extensively to indicate martyrs who died for his or her Islamic religion or within the protection of their nation, household, and property.
Asserting the demise of IS’s third caliph Abu al-Hassan, Islamic State’s al-Furqan Media mentioned that “he sacrificed his peace of thoughts, his soul, and his property for the sake of Allah.” Additional, the editorial quoted Surah At-Tawba from the Quran: “Certainly, Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their properties in trade for that they’ll have Paradise.” It’s noteworthy that, exploiting the examples of its late caliphs, the Islamic State seeks to encourage its followers to sacrifice their lives and properties for sake of Islam with a view to earn the mercy of Allah Almighty and enter Paradise.
In accordance with Islam, even the garments of a martyr purchase a sacred worth. A Shaheed who fell on the battlefield needs to be buried in the identical garments with out washing him or not wrapping in a shroud. Deliberately leaving traces of martyrdom on the physique, Islam elevates the position and significance of the martyr who sacrificed his life “within the path of Allah and Islam.” Maybe, ISIS’ third caliph Abu al-Hassan was buried in line with the Martyrdom canons in Syrian Daraa province, whereas nothing was left from the our bodies of first and second IS caliphs, al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim, after the explosions.
In conclusion, the focused killings of IS leaders over the previous three years have catalyzed the ideological revival of its provinces, because the victims have been heroized as martyrs. ISIS has strategically developed ideological narratives across the fame, charisma, and selflessness of the “martyred” caliphs, after which used these myths to recruit new supporters and develop its provinces. Evaluation means that the focused killing of IS leaders might have an effect on lowering ISIS’ capabilities and violence, however alternatively, it supplies meals for the glorification of its murdered leaders for the flourishing of its violent ideology.
Due to this fact, it might be preferable for the U.S. counterterrorism forces and their strategic companions to seize the highest leaders of IS and al-Qaeda to deprive them of the chance to govern inspiring spiritual narratives. Certainly, capturing is commonly most popular to focused killings. In contrast to martyrs, captive caliphs don’t have sacred worth and can’t affect the revival of ISIS ideology. However one can assume that the Islamic State will proceed to depend on the Islamic idea of Shaheed and its bay’ah campaigns for a very long time to outlive after every focused killing of its leaders.
