Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, December 14

December 14, 7:30 pm ET

Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alluded determination to postpone his annual tackle to the Russian Federation Meeting signifies he stays unsure of his means to form the Russian data area amidst growing criticism of his conduct of the invasion of Ukraine. The Presidential Tackle to the Federal Meeting to the Russian State Duma and Federation Council is an annual speech launched to the Russian structure in February 1994, roughly equal to the US President’s annual State of the Union tackle. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that Putin might ship his tackle to the Federation Meeting in 2023 and referred to as on Russians to cease “fortune-telling with espresso grounds” relating to the timing of the following tackle.[1] An unnamed authorities supply informed the Russian state newswire TASS that the countdown for the brand new tackle begins from the date of the earlier tackle, noting that the tackle is unlikely to happen in 2022.[2] Putin held his final tackle in late April 2021, discussing his initiatives for the yr following the primary disaster he induced with the Russian army buildup on the Ukrainian border in early 2021.[3]

The Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast and northern Ukraine in April 2022 doubtless spoiled Putin’s plans to declare victory throughout the Federation Meeting tackle. Putin had beforehand seized the chance in March 2014 to ship the “Crimean Speech,” whereby he introduced the unlawful annexation of Crimea and town of Sevastopol.[4] Putin doubtless anticipated an analogous final result in early spring solely to indefinitely postpone the tackle, doubtless on account of Russian army failures, his introduced annexation of territories Russian forces didn’t management, and public dissatisfaction with mobilization. Putin could also be nonetheless ready and hoping to ship a grandiose victory speech in 2023 or suspending the second when he should admit that Russia can’t obtain his incessantly restated maximalist goals in Ukraine.

Putin is probably not assured in his means to justify the price of his battle upon Russian home and world affairs when addressing the Russian public and elites. The unnamed TASS supply famous that the tackle requires important preparation by the president and his employees because it usually addresses plans for all facets of Russian society—financial system, training, army, world partnerships, and so on. A victory in Ukraine might have allowed Putin to obfuscate Russian human and monetary losses because it did in 2014, however Russia has not had any important victories for the reason that Russian occupation of Lysychansk in early July. Putin had beforehand tried to promote the annexation of partially occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts on September 30 as a serious victory, solely to reportedly generate additional grumbling amongst Russian elites and undermine state propaganda narratives.[5] Putin’s most up-to-date appearances on December 7 and December 9 provided obscure responses to some considerations over the size of the battle, a second mobilization wave, and a claimed Ukrainian menace to Russian territory but additionally generated some criticism and confusion inside the Russian pro-war neighborhood.[6] The Russian withdrawal from Kherson Metropolis had additionally angered outstanding nationalist ideologists who had begun to query Putin’s dedication and talent to ascertain “Higher Russia.”[7]

Putin has already canceled his annual press convention with the members of the Russian public, doubtless in an try and keep away from answering questions on Russia’s army failures with out resorting to excessively apparent manipulation of questioners and questions. Peskov introduced on December 12 that Putin is not going to maintain his dwell press convention with Russians, which he had been internet hosting for ten years.[8] Putin seems to be more and more turning to scripted and pre-recorded appearances equivalent to his assembly with 18 hand-picked, politically prosperous girls on November 25 who falsely launched themselves as moms of mobilized servicemen.[9] Putin is probably going trying to preempt the dangers related to having to reply to a fancy query. The cancellation of the press convention, nevertheless, might undermine Putin’s populist attraction as a ruler in contact together with his inhabitants.

Ukrainian officers are forecasting that Russia might try and launch a large-scale offensive within the early months of 2023. Ukrainian Overseas Minister Dmytro Kuleba acknowledged on December 13 that indicators equivalent to Russian mobilization efforts, the announcement of conscription, and the motion of heavy weaponry recommend that Russia could also be getting ready for a large-scale offensive in January and February 2023.[10] Kuleba’s assertion is in line with ISW’s long-standing evaluation that the winter months will enhance the tempo of operations on either side and that situations on the bottom all through Ukraine will doubtless be conducive to offensive operations.[11]

Russian forces might most readily relaunch offensive operations alongside two foremost axes of advance within the coming months—alongside the Kharkiv-Luhansk border in northeastern Ukraine, or in Donetsk Oblast. Russian troops seem like shifting heavy tools from rear areas in Luhansk Oblast to areas close to the present frontline alongside the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and have reshaped and reconsolidated their drive grouping alongside this line, as ISW has lately reported.[12] Ukrainian and Russian sources have lately reported that Russian troops are conducting restricted offensive operations alongside this line, significantly to regain misplaced positions west of Kreminna.[13] A current drop in temperatures on this space to persistently below-freezing has allowed the bottom to solidify, doubtless setting situations for growing the tempo of offensive operations.

Russian fight energy that was freed up following the withdrawal from the west (proper) financial institution of Kherson Oblast has redeployed to numerous areas in Donbas, strengthened by mobilized reservists. Russian forces may also hope to launch an offensive in western Donetsk Oblast to construct on marginal advances made within the Vuhledar-Pavlivka space in November.[14] ISW continues to evaluate that Russian forces search to finish the seize of everything of Donetsk Oblast, and potential future offensives in western Donetsk Oblast could also be meant to enhance ongoing offensive drives on the western outskirts of Donetsk Metropolis and round Bakhmut to perform this wider territorial goal. Nevertheless, regardless of the potential for brand spanking new offensive operations, ISW continues to evaluate that Russian fight functionality stays degraded and that Russian troops are extremely unlikely to have the ability to take strategically-significant territory within the coming months.

Ukrainian air protection models shot down all of the Shahed drones that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on December 14. Ukrainian army sources reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 drones at essential infrastructure amenities in Ukraine, together with areas of Kyiv Oblast, and that Ukrainian air protection forces shot down all of the drones.[15]

Ukrainian sources reported that 64 Ukrainian prisoners of battle (POWs), together with one American civilian, returned to Ukraine on December 14.[16] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration introduced the trade however didn’t specify what number of Russian troopers have been a part of the deal.[17] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) notably has not commented on the trade as of the time of this publication, which can draw criticism from outstanding voices within the Russian milblogger data area who’ve referred to as for elevated transparency from the Russian MoD in its dealing with of prisoner exchanges.[18]

The Kremlin will doubtless intensify present data operations accusing Ukraine’s authorities of oppressing non secular liberty in Ukraine. Distinguished Professional-Russian Telegram Channel Readovka made a submit to its 1.5 million subscribers claiming that Ukraine’s State Safety Service (SBU) raided Russian Orthodox church buildings in 9 Ukrainian oblasts and accusing the SBU of conducting arbitrary “terror” searches to detain Russian Orthodox clergy on December 14.[19] This narrative comprises components of a number of noticed Russian data operations designed to falsely painting Ukraine as oppressing Russian non secular minorities.

Ukraine is just not attacking non secular liberty or Japanese Orthodoxy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree to impose private sanctions in opposition to representatives of non secular organizations related to the Russian authorities on December 2.[20] This decree targets Kremlin-linked components of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP). The UOC MP is just not an unbiased non secular group. The UOC MP is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s subordinate department in Ukraine.[21] The UOC MP materially supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Japanese Ukraine in 2014 and continues to assist Russia’s present invasion.[22] Ukrainian authorities convicted a Moscow Patriarchate priest in Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, for offering details about Ukrainian forces to Russian forces since April 2022, for instance.[23]

The UOC MP is just not the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, regardless of some inaccurate Western reporting characterizing it as “the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”[24] The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a separate entity that gained autocephaly (official independence) from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019.[25] The UOC MP is a small factor inside Ukraine’s non secular demography. A number of surveys carried out in 2022 discovered that solely 4 p.c of Ukrainians establish as members of the Moscow Patriarchate, whereas over 50 p.c of Ukrainians establish as members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[26] Greater than double of the UOC MP’s present adherents recognized as Greek Catholics (8.8 p.c) in 2021.[27]

The Kremlin will doubtless intensify data operations accusing Ukraine of attacking freedom of the press inside the subsequent three months. Ukraine’s parliament handed a media regulation on December 13 to fulfill a European Union membership prerequisite.[28] This regulation expands the powers of Ukrainian state censors over media organizations—together with on-line media, forbids spreading Russian propaganda or data that disparages the Ukrainian language or defends the Soviet regime that dominated from 1917-1991, and establishes regulatory ratios for Ukrainian-language content material versus Russian-language content material on radio stations. These insurance policies don’t outlaw Russian-language media or using the Russian language in Ukraine however take steps to protect using the Ukrainian language in opposition to the Kremlin’s marketing campaign of cultural genocide that seeks to eradicate the notion of a singular Ukrainian cultural identification.[29] The Kremlin intensified data operations that Ukraine attacked freedom of the press in early 2021 after Ukraine banned three outstanding pro-Russian tv channels linked to key Putin ally Viktor Medvedchuk.[30] Ukraine’s new media regulation will enter into drive three months after its ratification.[31]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly postponed his annual tackle to the Russian Federal Meeting, indicating that the Kremlin is just not assured that it might probably proceed to form the Russian data area.
Ukrainian officers are forecasting that Russian forces might try and launch a large-scale offensive in the beginning of 2023.
Ukrainian air defenses shot down all drones that Russian forces launched in assaults on December 14.
Ukrainian sources reported that 64 POWs returned to Ukrainian-held territory.
The Kremlin will doubtless intensify data operations geared toward presenting the Ukrainian authorities as oppressing non secular liberties and freedom of the press.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and Russian forces carried out counterattacks within the Svatove and Kreminna areas.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas.
Russian forces continued defensive operations south of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Kremlin officers admitted to receiving complaints about mobilization regardless of mobilization’s “de facto ”
Ukrainian partisans proceed to assist Ukrainian forces in figuring out priceless Russian targets.

We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to judge and report on the results of those prison actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these studies.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Japanese Ukraine
Russian Major Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Major Effort—Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
Actions in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Japanese Ukraine: (Japanese Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations within the path of Svatove on December 14. Russian media outlet RIA Novosti claimed that Russian forces have routinely repelled Ukrainian assaults within the path of Svatove in current days.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces try to interrupt via to the R-66 (Svatove-Kreminna) freeway close to Svatove and maintained defenses in Novoselivkse, Luhansk Oblast (14km northwest of Svatove).[33] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian reserves from Kharkiv and Chuhuiv permit Ukrainian forces to proceed to extend the tempo of counteroffensive operations within the path of Svatove.[34]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations within the path of Kreminna on December 14. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces thwarted Ukrainian assaults close to Kreminna and Ploshchanka (16km north of Kreminna) and destroyed Ukrainian reconnaissance teams close to Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that present muddy climate situations within the Kreminna space are stopping Ukrainian forces from utilizing gentle automobiles.[36] The Russian milblogger additionally claimed that closely fortified Russian frontlines strengthened with mobilized personnel are stopping Ukrainian cell teams from breaking via Russian defensive positions within the Kreminna space.[37] A BARS-13 (Russian Fight Reserve) affiliated supply warned that Ukrainian forces will have the ability to seize the initiative in the event that they take Kreminna.[38] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drive focus space close to Novoaidar, Luhansk Oblast (58km southeast of Kreminna ) on the night time of December 12 to 13, killing greater than 15 Russian army personnel.[39]

Russian forces continued to conduct counterattacks within the Svatove and Kreminna areas on December 14. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northwest of Svatove close to Hryanykivka in Kharkiv Oblast (51km northwest of Svatove) and Novoselivske.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces to the outskirts of Novoselivkse.[41] One other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces additionally tried to advance towards Stelmakhivka in Luhansk Oblast (15km northwest of Svatove).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces tried to advance within the path of Makiivka (21km northwest of Kreminna) and continued to conduct counterattacks close to Kreminna to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces.[43] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults north of Kreminna close to Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and south of Kreminna close to Serebrianka (11km south of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).

Russian Major Effort—Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Major Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations round Bakhmut on December 14. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Bakhmut, 14km south of Bakhmut close to Kurdyumivka, and inside 23km northeast of Bakhmut close to Bilohorivka, Soledar, and Bakhmutske.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces carried out assaults northeast of Bakhmut close to Yakovlivka and Pidhorodne.[45] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established management over positions on the outskirts of Soledar.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group models and Ukrainian forces are combating on the jap outskirts of Bakhmut.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that combating between Russian and Ukrainian forces has shifted from the economic zone on the jap outskirts of Bakhmut to residential areas.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces carried out assaults south of Bakhmut close to Klishchiivka and continued to clear Opytne, following earlier Russian claims that Russian forces have nearly totally captured the settlement.[49] Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that combating is ongoing in Opytne and that Ukrainian forces are placing up fierce resistance within the space.[50]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space on December 14. The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults inside 37km southwest of Avdiivka close to Nevelske, Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[51] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured the principle a part of Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka).[52] Russian sources claimed that the seize of Vodyane would permit Russian forces to launch future offensive operations in direction of Tonenke (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and permits Russian forces to interdict Ukrainian provide routes from Orlivka to Avdiivka.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces carried out assaults close to Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka) and that combating between Russian and Ukrainian forces is ongoing within the Marinka metropolis heart.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces tried to regain misplaced positions southwest of Avdiivka close to Pisky and Vodyane.[55]

Russian forces reportedly carried out defensive operations in western Donetsk on December 14. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces thwarted Ukrainian counterattacks inside 75km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis within the path of Pavlivka, Novomaiorske, and Neskuchne in western Donetsk Oblast.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces switched to defensive operations following an unsuccessful try and storm Ukrainian positions within the path of Velyka Novosilka (74km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[57] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Russian forces continued routine oblique fireplace alongside the road of contact in Donetsk and jap Zaporizhia oblasts.[58]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations south of the Dnipro River and carried out artillery strikes on the west (proper) financial institution of Kherson Oblast on December 14. Satellite tv for pc imagery circulated by Russian and Ukrainian channels reveals Russian fortifications comprised of three rows of “dragon’s enamel” in Kherson Oblast, however one Russian milblogger famous that there are shortcomings within the construction proven within the photos of Russian trenches and questioned if they’d be efficient in defending in opposition to substantial blast waves or mine and projectile fragments.[59] The Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) posted footage of its fighters reportedly partaking in small arms and grenade fireplace in opposition to Ukrainian positions on the road of contact alongside the Dnipro River.[60] Russian forces shelled settlements alongside the west financial institution shoreline of the Dnipro River and considerably broken the Kherson Metropolis Administration Constructing with multiple-launch-rocket-system (MLRS) fireplace.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Residents and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian troops struck recreation facilities the place Russian troopers lived in Skadovsk and Lazurne (each south of the Dnipro River) on the night time of December 13 and morning of December 14.[62] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian strikes hit Russian focus areas all through Zaporizhia Oblast between December 12 and 14.[63]

Russian authorities are persevering with efforts to consolidate administrative, bureaucratic, and informational management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) and the encompassing metropolis of Enerhodar. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov reported on December 14 that Eduard Senovoz, a Rosatom (Russian nuclear energy firm) worker and the previous Normal Director of the Smolensk Nuclear Energy Plant, is the brand new head of Enerhodar.[64] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle additionally reported that Russian authorities are coercing Ukrainian staff of the ZNPP to signal employment contracts with Rosatom and threatening to fireside and substitute them with Russian operators in the event that they fail to take action by January 1.[65] Russian sources continued to conduct data operations to accuse Ukraine of threatening the security of the ZNPP.[66]

Russian forces continued routine shelling in western Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts on December 14.[67] Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that Russian strikes hit port infrastructure in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[68] Ukrainian air protection shot down Shahed-136 drones that Russian forces reportedly launched at Odesa Oblast.[69]

Observe: ISW will report on actions in Kherson Oblast as a part of the Southern Axis on this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has achieved its acknowledged aims, so ISW is not going to current a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive part till Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)

Kremlin officers admitted to receiving continued complaints about mobilization regardless of its de facto finish. The Kremlin’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Tatyana Moskalkova, acknowledged that she receives about 60-70 “horrible, agonizing, heavy” appeals relating to mobilization issues regardless that mobilization has “de-facto” concluded in Russia.[70] Moskalkova’s obscure assertion contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing assertions that Russia has legally finalized its mobilization marketing campaign and feeds into the continuing Russian concern relating to the necessity for Putin to signal a decree formally ending mobilization.[71]

Choose Russian federal topics are persevering with to disclaim the mobilized personnel’s complaints relating to poor tools and residing situations. Kemerovo Oblast officers distributed a video wherein mobilization advisor Yuriy Yelgin makes an attempt to disprove accusations by a gaggle from the 247th Air Assault Regiment that complained in regards to the lack of garments and provides.[72] Yelegin claimed that he personally distributed tools to the regiment and that the commanders of the regiment denied these studies.[73] Kemerovo Oblast officers then distributed footage of a small group of males who claimed to be mobilized reservists from the 247th Air Assault Regiment and acknowledged that they haven’t skilled any provide shortages and that that they had no complaints in regards to the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[74] The group didn’t function the people from the unique video and recorded the video on the identical location as the unique attraction.

Russian battle efforts might additional contribute to the mind drain and restrict some skilled specialties in Russia. Kremlin-sponsored enterprise outlet Kommersant reported that Rossiya Airways is planning to droop a 3rd of its pilots flying Airbus plane, with some Russian officers noting that this determination goals to preserve spare elements for Airbus planes amidst sanctions.[75] Kommersant reported that different Russian airways are sustaining their employees and that some are even hiring new pilots. ISW additionally beforehand noticed situations of the Kremlin trying to mobilize industrial pilots, and such personnel cuts could also be in preparation for the following mobilization wave or replicate the impression of Western sanctions on Russian air carriers.[76] Russian opposition retailers additionally reported that Russian officers are getting ready a regulation that may ban IT, public companies, and safety personnel from working from residence.[77] An unnamed Russian parliamentarian acknowledged that the regulation goals to not directly drive Russian personnel who fled Russia on account of mobilization to return to the nation.[78]

The Kremlin continues to depend on monetary incentives to lure males into collaborating within the battle in Ukraine. Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov introduced on December 14 that the occupation State Council of Crimea adopted a regulation that gives a free plot of land in Crimea to contributors of the “particular army operation.”[79] Aksyonov specified that the occupation administration will distribute land to people that had a Crimean everlasting residency as of February 24, 2022.[80]

Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)

Ukrainian partisans proceed to undermine Russian occupation by aiding Ukrainian forces in figuring out priceless Russian targets. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on December 14 that Ukrainian partisans in Donetsk Oblast supplied data to Ukrainian forces that resulted in a Ukrainian precision strike on Russian manpower and tools in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, ensuing within the dying of 100 Russian servicemembers.[81] The Wall Avenue Journal (WSJ) reported that at the least 20 Ukrainian partisans in Kherson Metropolis supplied continuous intelligence to Ukrainian forces throughout the Russian occupation of Kherson Metropolis.[82] WSJ acknowledged that the intelligence supplied by Ukrainian partisans performed a key position in guiding Ukrainian precision strikes, which in the end compelled Russian troops to desert town in November.[83] ISW beforehand assessed on November 1 that Russian occupation forces have didn’t neutralize Ukraine’s organized partisan motion and are unlikely to own the aptitude to take action sooner or later.[84]

The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Russian occupation officers are growing the strain on Ukrainian residents to use for Russian passports in a failed try and validate the September 30 Russian Annexation Referendum.[85] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle acknowledged that occupied Russian territories have very low Russian passport issuance charges—within the tens of 1000’s reasonably than tens of millions—which immediately undermines the Russian declare that 99% of Ukrainians supported the annexation referendum.[86] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Russian occupation authorities have created unlivable situations for Ukrainians who refuse to use for Russian passports and launched accelerated passport issuance in an try and rectify the disparity between their claims and the demonstrated lack of Ukrainian curiosity in acquiring Russian passports.[87]

Russian occupation officers continued to limit the motion of Ukrainian residents out of occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that since Russian occupation authorities launched exit passes in October, the variety of Ukrainians allowed to depart occupied territories has dramatically decreased from a median of two,000 Ukrainians a day to 800 every week.[88] Zaporizhia Oblast State Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh additionally reported that Russian occupation authorities in Zaporizhia are stopping residents from leaving.[89]

A Russian media opposition supply reported that Donetsk public utilities staff could also be planning to strike quickly as a consequence of intensified mobilization efforts and the overwork attributable to labor shortages.[90] The supply reported on December 13 that Donetsk public utilities sector staff are complaining about power overwork, no wage raises, and poor working situations.[91] The supply additionally acknowledged that mobilization has induced financial devastation and enormously decreased the labor pool as many native males have been killed or badly wounded.[92]

Observe: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://www dot interfax dot ru/russia/876856

[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/16586831

[3] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/65418

[4] http://en dot kremlindot ru/occasions/president/information/20603

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/30/putin-annexation-speech-more-angry-taxi-driver-than-head-of-state-ukraine

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12

[8] https://meduza(dot)io/information/2022/12/12/bolshaya-press-konferentsiya-putina-v-2022-godu-ne-sostoitsya; https://meduza(dot)io/information/2022/11/14/rbk-kreml-vpervye-za-10-let-mozhet-perenesti-bolshuyu-press-konferentsiyu-putina

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25

[10] https://suspilne.media/337956-rf-moze-ponoviti-sprobi-nastupu-na-pocatku-2023-roku-kuleba/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYSwqRAtRh0

[11] https://suspilne.media/337956-rf-moze-ponoviti-sprobi-nastupu-na-pocatku-2023-roku-kuleba/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYSwqRAtRh0

[12] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/standing/1601718010162839552; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121222

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112522; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111822; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct18

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar1115422; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110522

[15] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AbP5fLbw9FDL5MZBmvYA93zw13W6eFbySqpazfj8o7xaCDTja8uo5KhJRweg9T6Hl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/14/prezydent-ukrayiny-podyakuvav-sylam-ppo-zbyto-13-z-13-shahediv/; https://t.me/kpszsu/2210 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/2211

[16] https://minre dot gov dot ua/information/z-vorozhogo-polonu-povernuly-shche-65-osib; https://t.me/ermaka2022/1771; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/373 https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1602993889505411075?s=20&t=D2_v8prXO5FanEP17gN-rQ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1602995268433084418?s=20&t=D2_v8prXO5FanEP17gN-rQ

[17] https://minre.gov dot ua/information/z-vorozhogo-polonu-povernuly-shche-65-osib

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102922; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112522

[19] https://t.me/readovkanews/48868

[20] https://apnews.com/article/zelenskyy-kyiv-religion-europe-government-and-politics-7eaf9ac19b000a2147f0204877a0004e

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/Putinpercent27spercent20Offsetpercent20Thepercent20Kremlinpercent27spercent20Geopoliticalpercent20Adaptationspercent20Sincepercent202014.pdf; https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-kremlin-uses-the-church-in-europes-east/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-faces-setbacks-balkans; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-targets-opposition-leadership-non-military-kremlin; https://www.understandingwar.org/websites/default/recordsdata/E23percent20-%20Kremlinpercent20Usespercent20COVID-19percent20Misinformation.pdf; https://www.rbth.com/historical past/331371-stalin-orthodox-church

[22] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-kremlin-uses-the-church-in-europes-east/

[23] https://www.gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/do-12-rokiv-za-gratami-zasudzeno-svyashhennika-upc-mp-v-luganskii-oblasti-za-informuvannya-voroga-pro-poziciyi-ukrayinskix-zaxisnikiv

[24] https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-this-reality-about-ukraines-zelenskyy

[25] https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/after-100-year-battle-ukraine-wins-independent-church-finally-in-2019.html

[26] https://www.sapiens.com dot ua/publications/socpol-research/215/Release_IS_war_fin_6_04_church_language_ENG.pdf; https://www.kiis.com dot ua/?lang=ukr&cat=studies&id=1129&web page=1

[27] https://www.state.gov/studies/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ukraine/

[28] https://bukinfo.com dot ua/mas-media/verhovna-rada-uhvalyla-zakon-pro-media; http://krivbass dot metropolis/information/view/verhovna-rada-prijnyala-zakon-pro-media-yakij-neobhidnij-dlya-vstupu-v-es; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/v-ukrayini-uhvalili-zakonoproyekt-pro-media-yakij-neobhidnij-dlya-vstupu-v-yes-sho-vin-peredbachaye; https://www.rada.gov dot ua/information/news_kom/231238.html;

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30

[30] https://rg dot ru/2021/02/03/zelenskij-zakryl-na-ukraine-tri-oppozicionnyh-telekanala.html; https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/article/829558-zelenskii-telekanaly-sankcii; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/620d86e09a794741df1537c8

[31] https://jurliga.ligazakon dot internet/information/216066_ukhvaleno-zakon-pro-meda#:~:textual content=%D0percent92percentD1percent96percentD0percentB4percentD0percentBFpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB2percentD1percent96percentD0percentB4percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentBEpercent20percentD0percentB4percentD0percentBEpercent20percentD0percentBFpercentD0percentB5percentD1percent80percentD0percentB5percentD1percent85percentD1percent96percentD0percentB4percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB8percentD1percent85percent20percentD0percentBFpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBBpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB6percentD0percentB5percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent8Cpercent20percentD0percent97percentD0percentB0percentD0percentBApercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBD,%D0percentBFpercentD0percentB5percentD0percentB2percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB8percentD1percent85percent20percentD0percentBFpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBBpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB6percentD0percentB5percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent8Cpercent20percentD0percentB2percentD0percentB8percentD0percentB7percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB0percentD1percent87percentD0percentB5percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent96percent20percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBApercentD1percent80percentD0percentB5percentD0percentBCpercentD1percent96percent20percentD1percent81percentD1percent82percentD1percent80percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBApercentD0percentB8.&textual content=%D0percentAEpercentD1percent80percentD0percentB8percentD0percentB4percentD0percentB8percentD1percent87percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB8percentD0percentB9percent20percentD0percentB1percentD1percent96percentD0percentB7percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB5percentD1percent81percent20percent2Dpercent20percentD1percent86percentD0percentB5percent20percentD0percentB1percentD1percent96percentD0percentBBpercentD1percent8CpercentD1percent88percentD0percentB5percent2Cpercent20percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent96percentD0percentB6,%D0percentB7percentD0percentB0percentD0percentBApercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentBDpercentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB4percentD0percentB0percentD0percentB2percentD1percent87percentD1percent83percent2Cpercent20percentD0percentBCpercentD0percentB5percentD0percentB4percentD1percent96percentD0percentB9percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent83percent20percentD1percent82percentD0percentB0percent20percentD1percent84percentD1percent96percentD0percentBDpercentD0percentB0percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent81percentD0percentBEpercentD0percentB2percentD1percent83percent20percentD1percent96percentD0percentBDpercentD1percent84percentD0percentBEpercentD1percent80percentD0percentBCpercentD0percentB0percentD1percent86percentD1percent96percentD1percent8E.

[32] https://t.me/rian_ru/188559

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72755

[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72755

[35]

[36] https://t.me/milchronicles/1390

[37] https://t.me/milchronicles/1390

[38] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35263

[39] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[40] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[41] https://t.me/voenkors/281

[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/9775

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/9775 ; https://t.me/rybar/42010

[44] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/9775 ; https://t.me/rybar/41999 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/14130

[46] https://t.me/rybar/41999

[47] https://t.me/rybar/41999 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/14130 ;

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72754

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/9775 ; https://t.me/rybar/41999 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/14130

[50] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/132

[51] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/22649

[53] https://t.me/kommunist/14192 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/14142 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72767

[54] https://t.me/rybar/42000 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/14136 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9775

[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72767 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35274

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/22649

[57] https://t.me/rybar/42000

[58] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AbP5fLbw9FDL5MZBmvYA93zw13W6eFbySqpazfj8o7xaCDTja8uo5KhJRweg9T6Hl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[59] https://t.me/milinfolive/94396; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/16249; https://t.me/andriyshTime/5012

[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9589

[62] https://t.me/hueviyherson/30916; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30917; ttps://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/24669

[63] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AbP5fLbw9FDL5MZBmvYA93zw13W6eFbySqpazfj8o7xaCDTja8uo5KhJRweg9T6Hl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033UZoC2ogUYsnguFaXBrDXaoDUa7FLquhotGeYpBsAKj15qCCjLcSHHiw47xgjugcl

[64] https://t.me/vrogov/6504

[65] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/14/bilshist-praczivnykiv-zaes-vidmovlyayutsya-ukladaty-dogovir-z-rosatomom/

[66] https://t.me/readovkanews/48882; https://t.me/vrogov/6505

[67] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/15452; https://t.me/wargonzo/9775; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2725; https://t.me/vilkul/2373 ; https://t.me/vilkul/2380; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1724 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1735 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1745 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1742; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1740 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1742

[68] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/3730

[69] https://t.me/stranaua/80434

[70] https://www dot interfax dot ru/russia/876926

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/17880

[72] https://t.me/sibirmedia/24443

[73] https://t.me/sibirmedia/24443

[74] https://t.me/sibirmedia/24443?remark=77518

[75] https://www dot kommersant dot ru/doc/5720805

[76] https://meduza dot io/en/information/2022/09/23/russian-airline-employees-summoned-less-than-a-day-after-mobilization-declared

[77] https://meduza dot io/information/2022/12/14/verstka-v-rossii-zapretyat-chinovnikam-i-rabotnikam-sfery-informatsionnyy-bezopasnosti-rabotat-udalenno-zapret-kosnetsya-rossiyan-uehavshih-iz-za-voyny

[78] https://meduza dot io/information/2022/12/14/verstka-v-rossii-zapretyat-chinovnikam-i-rabotnikam-sfery-informatsionnyy-bezopasnosti-rabotat-udalenno-zapret-kosnetsya-rossiyan-uehavshih-iz-za-voyny

[79] https://t.me/Aksenov82/1861

[80] https://t.me/Aksenov82/1861

[81] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/14/ukrayinske-pidpillya-dopomoglo-znyshhyty-voroga-v-gorlivczi/

[82] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-secret-weapon-is-ordinary-people-spying-on-russian-forces-11671012147

[83] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-secret-weapon-is-ordinary-people-spying-on-russian-forces-11671012147

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-and-assessment-verified-ukrainian-partisan-attacks-against-russian

[85]https://sprotyv dot mod.dot gov.ua/2022/12/14/okupanty-pospishayut-provesty-pasportyzacziyu-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah/

[86] https://sprotyv dot mod.dot gov.ua/2022/12/14/okupanty-pospishayut-provesty-pasportyzacziyu-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah/

[87] https://sprotyv dot mod.dot gov.ua/2022/12/14/okupanty-pospishayut-provesty-pasportyzacziyu-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah/

[88] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/12/13/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-blokuvaty-vyyizd-ukrayincziv-z-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytorij/

[89] https://t.me/starukhofficial/4426 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/15451

[90] https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/14265

[91] https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/14265

[92] https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/14265

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