AFGHANISTAN, December 17 –
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Katherine Lawlor, Layne Phillipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 16, 6:00 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Russian forces carried out their ninth large-scale missile marketing campaign in opposition to essential Ukrainian power infrastructure on December 16 and carried out one of many largest missile assaults on Kyiv up to now. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Basic Valery Zaluzhny said that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 60 of 76 Russian missiles, of which 72 have been cruise missiles of the Kh-101, Kalibr, and Kh-22 varieties, and 4 guided missiles of the Kh-59 and Kh-31P varieties.[1] The Kyiv Metropolis Army Administration reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 37 of 40 missiles focusing on Kyiv.[2] Ukrainian officers additionally reported that Russian missiles struck 9 power infrastructure amenities and a few residential buildings in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[3] Ukrainian army officers famous that Russian forces launched most of their missiles from the Black and Caspian seas and the Engels airfield in Saratov Oblast.[4] Russian forces are possible intensifying their strikes on Kyiv to fire up societal discontent within the capital, however these missile assaults are unlikely to interrupt Ukrainian will.
Russian strikes proceed to pose a big risk to Ukrainian civilians however usually are not bettering the flexibility of Russian forces to conduct offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s state electrical energy transmission system operator Ukrenergo said that restoration of electrical energy could also be delayed by the December 16 strikes and introduced a state of emergency aimed toward electrical energy market suppliers.[5] Ukrenergo added that Ukraine’s United Vitality System needed to minimize greater than 50% of power consumption on account of the strikes.[6]
Russian Nationwide Safety Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev made inflammatory however irrelevant feedback in help of ongoing info operations that purpose to weaken Western help for Ukraine. Medvedev revealed on December 16 a listing of what he described as reputable army targets, which included “the armed forces of different international locations which have formally entered the struggle” in Ukraine.[7] Medvedev rhetorically questioned whether or not Western army help to Ukraine implies that NATO members have entered the struggle in opposition to Russia.[8] Medvedev didn’t explicitly state that the armed forces of NATO members are reputable army targets nor that he was stating an official Russian place on reputable targets within the struggle in Ukraine.[9] Medvedev possible made the feedback in coordination with the large-scale Russian missile strikes in an try and weaken Western help for Ukraine by stoking fears of escalation between the West and Russia. Medvedev has beforehand made purposefully inflammatory feedback in help of different info operations with the identical goals.[10] Medvedev’s previous and present inflammatory rhetoric continues to be out of contact with precise Kremlin positions concerning the struggle in Ukraine. Russian forces have and can possible proceed to focus on Western army tools that Ukrainian forces have deployed in Ukraine, in fact, however there’s nothing stunning or outstanding in that reality.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will possible stress Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for Russian-Belarusian integration concessions at an upcoming December 19 assembly in Minsk—Putin’s first assembly with Lukashenko in Minsk since 2019.[11] Lukashenko and Putin reportedly will talk about Russian-Belarusian integration points, unspecified military-political points, and implementing Union State applications.[12] The Union State is a supranational settlement from 1997 with the said purpose of the federal integration of Russia and Belarus below a joint construction. The Kremlin seeks to make use of the Union State to determine Russian suzerainty (management) over Belarus.[13]
Lukashenko is already setting info situations to deflect Russian integration calls for as he has carried out for many years.[14] Lukashenko harassed that “no one however us is ruling Belarus,” and that Belarus is able to construct relations with Russia however that their ties “ought to all the time proceed from the premise that we’re a sovereign and unbiased state.”[15] It’s unclear whether or not Putin shall be profitable in extracting his desired concessions from Lukashenko. Lukashenko has up to now largely resisted intensified Russian integration calls for and has refused to commit Belarusian forces to affix Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Putin’s go to to Minsk might point out that Putin is attempting to set situations for the newly assessed most harmful plan of action (MDCOA) that ISW reported on December 15: a renewed offensive in opposition to Ukraine—presumably in opposition to northern Ukraine or Kyiv—in winter 2023.[16] Russian Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu and Belarusian Protection Minister Viktor Khrenin signed an unspecified doc to additional strengthen bilateral safety ties—possible within the context of the Russian-Belarusian Union State—and improve Russian stress on Belarus to additional help the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Minsk on December 3.[17] ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast a few potential Russian offensive in opposition to northern Ukraine in winter 2023 stays a worst-case state of affairs inside the forecast cone. ISW presently assesses a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, however potential. Belarusian forces stay extraordinarily unlikely to invade Ukraine with no Russian strike pressure. It’s removed from clear that Lukashenko would commit Belarusian forces to battle in Ukraine even alongside Russian troops. There are nonetheless no indicators that Russian forces are forming a strike pressure in Belarus.[18]
Putin and Lukashenko’s assembly will—at a minimal—advance a separate Russian info operation that seeks to interrupt Ukrainian will and Western willingness to help Ukraine, nonetheless. This assembly will reinforce the Russian info operation designed to persuade Ukrainians and Westerners that Russia could assault Ukraine from Belarus. Russia’s continued strikes in opposition to Kyiv, fixed troop deployments to Belarus, and continued bellicose rhetoric are a part of (and mutually reinforce) this info operation. The Kremlin is unlikely to interrupt the Ukrainian will to battle. The Kremlin possible seeks to persuade the West to simply accept a false fait accompli that Ukraine can not materially alter the present entrance traces and that the struggle is successfully stalemated. ISW assesses that such a conclusion is inaccurate and that Ukraine stands a great probability of regaining appreciable essential terrain within the coming months.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly ignored warnings about worst-case financial state of affairs assessments from senior Kremlin monetary advisors previous to launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Unnamed sources instructed the Monetary Occasions (FT) that the top of the Russian Central Financial institution, Elvira Nabiullina, and the top of Sberbank, German Gref, briefed a 39-page evaluation to Putin outlining the long-term injury to the Russian financial system if Russia acknowledged the independence of proxy republics in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts a month previous to the full-scale invasion.[19] FT sources famous that each Nabiullina and Gref spoke to Putin of their very own initiative however weren’t courageous sufficient to inform Putin that Russia risked a geopolitical catastrophe when he interrupted the temporary to ask how Russia can forestall a worst-case state of affairs. Nabiullina and Gref particularly warned Putin that Western sanctions would set the Russian financial system again by a long time and negatively influence the Russian high quality of life. Each Nabiullina and Gref reportedly have been shocked when Putin launched the invasion on February 24 and not directly expressed some discontent to their interior circles, regardless of implementing provisions to mitigate some detrimental impacts of sanctions through the first weeks of the struggle.
The report, if true, signifies that Putin had obtained some prognosis of the struggle’s dangers and prices however determined to disregard them in favor of his maximalist purpose of seizing Ukraine. It’s unclear if Putin obtained and subsequently ignored related experiences from the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) or the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA), however his engagement with Nabiullina and Gref exhibits that he had some consciousness of the potential long-term dangers of the struggle. Nabiullina’s and Gref’s reported hesitance to dissuade Putin additionally demonstrates the unbalanced energy dynamic which will have prompted some Russian officers to play together with Putin’s unhealthy choices slightly than remonstrating with him.
Russia is constant to endure some financial challenges as a direct results of Putin’s struggle in Ukraine. FT reported that Nabiullina was in a position to defend the Russian financial system from the worst-case state of affairs by endeavor provisions similar to regulation of the trade management through the first day of the struggle, however some struggle prices are possible catching as much as the Kremlin. Russia’s Central Financial institution introduced on December 16 that mobilization had sparked growing manpower shortages throughout a number of industries in Russia.[20] The Central Financial institution report added that Russia has restricted potentialities to increase its manufacturing on account of shortages within the state labor market and famous that “unemployment hit a historic low.” The prices of Putin’s struggle, together with the human and labor price of his pressure era efforts, will proceed to have a long-term impact on Russia’s financial system, as ISW has beforehand assessed.[21]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces carried out one other set of large-scale missile strikes all through Ukraine and one of many largest missile assaults in opposition to Kyiv up to now.
- Russian strikes proceed to pose a big risk to Ukrainian civilians regardless of producing no enchancment within the Russian skill to conduct offensive operations.
- Dmitry Medvedev made inflammatory however irrelevant feedback in help of ongoing info operations that purpose to weaken Western help for Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will possible stress Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to help the Russian struggle in Ukraine additional at a December 19 assembly in Minsk.
- Lukashenko is already setting info situations to deflect Russian integration calls for.
- Putin’s upcoming go to to Minsk might point out that he’s setting situations for a brand new offensive from Belarusian territory.
- Putin and Lukashenko’s assembly will possible advance a separate Russian info operation that seeks to interrupt Ukrainian will and Western willingness to help Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly ignored worst-case state of affairs assessments of potential injury to the Russian financial system previous to launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- Russia is constant to face financial challenges as a direct results of the struggle in Ukraine.
- Russian forces carried out counterattacks within the Svatove and Kreminna areas.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis areas.
- Russian forces continued to undertake defensive measures on the left (east) financial institution of the Dnipro River.
- Russian officers will possible wrestle to recruit extra contract servicemembers regardless of ongoing efforts to take action.
- Russian occupation authorities continued seizing civilian infrastructure to deal with wounded Russian servicemen and help Russian forces working in occupied territories.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity although we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Jap Ukraine
- Russian Principal Effort—Jap Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Jap Ukraine: (Jap Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces carried out counterattacks within the Svatove and Kreminna areas on December 16. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove) and Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove).[22] The Ukrainian Basic Workers additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults inside 17km north of Kreminna close to Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka and inside 12km south of Kreminna close to Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces continued combating in positional battles on the western outskirts of Bilohorivka.[24] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces additionally destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance teams southwest of Kreminna close to Terny, Donetsk Oblast, and Dibrova, Luhansk Oblast.[25] ISW beforehand assessed that Russian forces are possible conducting spoiling counterattacks in jap Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts to preempt Ukrainian forces from growing the tempo of their jap counteroffensive as situations change into extra conducive for mechanized maneuver warfare within the winter.[26]
Russian forces proceed to construct defensive fortifications alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line as of December 16. The UK Ministry of Protection (UK MoD) reported on December 16 that Russian forces have continued to assemble in depth defensive traces alongside the entrance line in jap Ukraine, notably round Svatove.[27] The UK MoD reported that the Russian defensive traces observe conventional entrenchment strategies, that are prone to be susceptible to trendy, precision oblique strikes.[28]
Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast. Russian and social media sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas in Kadiivka, Lantrativka, and Irmino in Luhansk Oblast on December 15 and 16.[29] A social media supply claimed that there was an explosion at a weapons depot in Kadiivka.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Irmino.[31]
Russian Principal Effort—Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Principal Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations round Bakhmut on December 16. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Bakhmut; inside 26km northeast of Bakhmut close to Vyimka, Yakovlivka , Soledar, and Bakhmutske; and inside 21km south of Bakhmut close to Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Kurdyumivka, Opytne, Ozarianivka, and Druzhba.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces fully cleared Yakovlivka, which can assist Russian forces to conduct assaults within the course of Soledar.[33] Geolocated footage posted on December 16 exhibits Wagner Group models working in central Yakovlivka, supporting this Russian declare.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces take into account holding Bakhmut a precedence activity over fears that dropping the settlement would injury the present picture of Ukrainian forces.[35] Geolocated footage posted on December 16 exhibits that Russian forces have made marginal advances west of Ozaranivka.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space on December 16. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults inside 17km north of Avdiivka close to Novobakhmutivka and Oleksandropil, and inside 37km south of Avdiivka close to Nevelske, Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailiivka.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out an assault close to Vesele intending to chop a bit of the N-20 freeway.[38] One other Russian milblogger claimed that the Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Peoples Militia’s “Somali” and “Sparta” battalions and the eleventh Regiment of the first Army Corps carried out assaults southwest of Avdiivka within the course of Nataylove and Karlivka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their efforts on capturing Ukrainian-held territory round Marinka.[40]
Russian forces reportedly continued defensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on December 16. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault close to Solodke, Donetsk Oblast (33km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis), and destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance teams close to Novomayorske and Shevchenko in western Donetsk oblast.[41] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces continued routine oblique fireplace alongside the road of contact in Donetsk and jap Zaporizhia oblasts.[42]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Preserve frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to undertake defensive measures on the left (east) financial institution of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces deployed personnel from Krasnodar Krai to strengthen defensive traces and safety for water provide amenities in Kherson Oblast and Crimea, such because the North Crimean Canal.[43] Sentinel-1 imagery additionally confirmed that Russian forces have accrued a considerable amount of army tools in Medvedivka in northeastern Crimea.[44] The Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) Militia claimed to carry defensive positions within the space of the Kakhovka reservoir in Zaporizhia Oblast.[45]
Russian forces continued to shell Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[46] Social media footage confirmed the aftermath of Russian artillery fireplace on residential buildings in Kherson Metropolis, and geolocated footage confirmed Russian forces mistakenly putting their former air-defense positions close to the T2207 freeway that Ukrainian forces beforehand destroyed in August.[47] Zaporizhia Oblast Workplace of Basic Prosecutor reported that Russian forces launched 21 missiles from S-300 air-defense methods at Zaporizhzhia Metropolis and surrounding settlements, which broken the premises of an unspecified piece of essential infrastructure.[48]
Ukrainian forces continued to focus on Russian logistics in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian strikes on December 14 wounded about 180 servicemen and destroyed as much as 10 items of kit in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian Basic Workers famous that Russian forces are working cell crematoria in Tokmak and that Ukrainian forces eradicated as much as 30 Russian servicemen in Lazurne on the left financial institution of the Dnipro River.[50] Geolocated footage revealed on December 16 additionally reportedly confirmed the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on Skadovsk.[51]
Word: ISW will report on actions in Kherson Oblast as a part of the Southern Axis on this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has achieved its said goals, so ISW won’t current a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive part till Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.
Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Broaden fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)
Russian officers will possible wrestle to recruit extra contract servicemembers regardless of ongoing efforts and can possible proceed to rely largely on conscripted and mobilized personnel. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported on December 16 that Russian forces are persevering with recruitment campaigns for contract servicemembers, notably to fill positions within the once-elite 1st Guards Tank Army.[52] The first Guards Tank Army has been closely degraded through the struggle and sure can now not perform within the elite strike pressure function that it as soon as performed within the Russian army; all maneuver components of the first Guards Tank Army have taken heavy losses close to Kharkiv, Sumy, and jap Kyiv Oblast since February 2022.
Russian mobilized forces in Ukraine are possible displaying an elevated curiosity in surrendering to Ukrainian forces as they face winter climate with out winter tools. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on December 14 that searches within the Russian search engine Yandex associated to give up have elevated dramatically since mid-November.[53] Verstka reported that customers looked for phrases regarding give up greater than 121,000 occasions between November 14 and December 4, a interval that coincides with experiences of large-scale Russian losses and the arrival of extra mobilized personnel to the frontlines. By comparability, Yandex recorded round 19,000 surrender-related searches from October 24 to November 13.
St. Petersburg officers reportedly refused to permit the burial of Wagner Group servicemembers in cemeteries designated for Russian servicemembers, highlighting the disparities within the therapy of unofficial army formations in Russia. Wagner financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin commented on the burial scandal, noting {that a} deceased Wagner servicemember, Dmitry Menshikov, fought for his motherland as a volunteer in Donbas whereas St. Petersburg officers have been “cowardly” hiding of their workplaces.[54] Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Protection Andrey Kartapolov additionally commented on the incident, noting that Wagner fighters are full-fledged contributors of the “particular army operation” and urging anybody debating this matter to “come to their senses.”[55] Kartapolov’s assertion could replicate some inside pushes within the Kremlin to formally legalize Wagner, provided that Russian legislation prohibits personal army corporations in Russia.
Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
Ukrainian sources reported on December 16 that Russian forces and occupation officers continued to grab and redirect civilian infrastructure to help Russian forces. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on December 16 that Russian occupation officers in occupied Donetsk Oblast have allotted all utility tools and assets to the Russian army, leaving civilians with out electrical energy and water.[56] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle added {that a} hospital in Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, has totally transitioned to solely treating wounded Russian servicemen and that the Luhansk Metropolis Multidisciplinary Hospital No. 15 refuses to simply accept civilian sufferers, planning to completely transition to a army hospital by the top of December, 2022.[57]
Russian-backed Zaporizhia Oblast officers introduced measures designed to eradicate Ukrainian cultural heritage on December 16. The pinnacle of the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration, Yevheny Balitsky, said on December 16 that Russian occupation authorities will rename all streets, alleys, and parks in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast by the top of the 12 months. Balitsky additionally said that Russian-backed Zaporizhia Oblast authorities will restore greater than 100 monuments devoted to Russia’s “Nice Heroes” that Ukrainian officers faraway from 2014-2022.[58] Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andryushenko said on December 16 that Russian occupation authorities have carried out a “diagnostic examination” in Mariupol colleges to evaluate how nicely Mariupol college students have realized the Russian language, the historical past of Moscow, basic data of Russia, and arithmetic within the Russian language.[59]
Russian occupation authorities are persevering with to accentuate filtration measures to eradicate alleged political dissidents from occupied territories. Ukrainian publication Graty reported on December 16 that Russian occupation authorities are forcibly transferring Ukrainian political prisoners from Crimea to penal colonies in Russia.[60] Graty famous that Russian occupation officers are transferring Ukrainian activists and 7 members of the “Crimean Solidarity” motion to prisons within the Republics of Dagestan and Mordovia, and Tambov, Tula, Novgorod, Ryazan, and Kostroma oblasts.
Ukrainian partisans continued to undermine the Russian occupation by serving to Ukrainian forces destroy useful Russian targets. The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on December 16 that Ukrainian partisans helped to right oblique fireplace (IDF) to destroy an unspecified Russian army base in occupied Luhansk Oblast, killing 20 Russian servicemembers and destroying eight items of Russian army tools on December 13.[61]
Word: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these experiences. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/CinCAFU/331; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72872 ; https://t.me/stranaua/80843; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/p…
[3] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SEbDVNTxnqhiQB1XSQ… https://t.me/energoatom_ua/11136; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/11135; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/11133; https://suspilne dot media/339628-rf-moze-gotuvati-novij-nastup-es-pogodiv-devatij-paket-sankcij-proti-rosii-296-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://suspilne dot media/339628-rf-moze-gotuvati-novij-nastup-es-pogodiv-devatij-paket-sankcij-proti-rosii-296-den-vijni-onlajn/
[4] https://t.me/kpszsu/2215; https://t.me/CinCAFU/331’; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72872 ; https://t.me/stranaua/80843
[5] https://suspilne dot media/339628-rf-moze-gotuvati-novij-nastup-es-pogodiv-devatij-paket-sankcij-proti-rosii-296-den-vijni-onlajn/
[6] https://suspilne dot media/339628-rf-moze-gotuvati-novij-nastup-es-pogodiv-devatij-paket-sankcij-proti-rosii-296-den-vijni-onlajn/
[7] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/232
[8] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/232
[9] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/232
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110622 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/181 ; …
[11] https://sputnik dot by/20190701/S-utra-i-do-samoy-nochi-kak-proshel-dolgozhdannyy-vizit-Putina-v-Minsk-1041838366.html; https://president.gov dot by/ru/occasions/aleksandr-lukashenko-19-dekabrya-provedet-peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossiyskoy-federacii-vladimirom-putinym
[12] https://president.gov dot by/ru/occasions/aleksandr-lukashenko-19-dekabrya-provedet-peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossiyskoy-federacii-vladimirom-putinym; https://information.zerkalo dot io/economics/28479.html
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-belarus-upda…
[15] https://tass dot com/world/1551691; http://www.business-gazeta dot ru/information/576390; https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-suverenitet-i-nezavisimost-nezyblemy-a-belarus-nikogda-ne-budet-vragom-rossii-540411-2022/
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass…
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass…
[19] https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2022/12/16/oni-byli-dostatochno-hrabrymi-chtoby-poprosit-nachalnika-o-vstreche-no-im-vse-ravno-ne-udalos-otgovorit-ego; https://www.ft.com/content material/fe5fe0ed-e5d4-474e-bb5a-10c9657285d2
[20] https://cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=16122022_133000Key.htm
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[22] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[23] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/22696
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign…
[27] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/standing/1603637770450309121
[28] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/standing/1603637770450309121
[29] https://t.me/kommunist/14236 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9873 ; https…
[30] https://twitter.com/samotniyskhid/standing/1603636903886159874
[32] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[34] https://t.me/yaremshooter/565 ; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/statu…
[36] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1603768244929699841?s=20&t=SwBNQ…
[37] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/9834
[39] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/6856
[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/9834
[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/22696
[42] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SEbDVNTxnqhiQB1XSQ…
[43] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SEbDVNTxnqhiQB1XSQ…
[44] https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/standing/1603502941314359301?s=20&t=3ILh…
[46] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SEbDVNTxnqhiQB1XSQ…
[47] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1603776561030766593;
[48] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/8204
[49] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[50] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[51] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/standing/1603777444040908802
[52] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AHUPDo1G12uxySvaVa8…
[53] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1056
[54] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/138
[55] https://t.me/pravda_oborona/2331
[56] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/16/na-donechchyni-gumanitarna-kryza-okupanty-napravlyayut-vsi-resursy-na-zabezpechennya-rosijskyh-vijskovyh/
[57] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/16/okupanty-perevodyat-usi-likarni-luganshhyny-na-obslugovuvannya-vijskovyh-rf/
[58] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/609; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72904
[59] https://t.me/andriyshTime/5071
[60] https://meduza dot io/information/2022/12/16/grati-osuzhdennyh-zhiteley-kryma-etapiruyut-za-predely-poluostrova;
[61] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/16/pidpillya-dopomoglo-znyzyty-bazu-okupantiv-na-luganshhyni/
