Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, November 23

November 23, 6:45 ET

Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

The Russian army carried out one other set of large, coordinated missile strikes on Ukrainian essential infrastructure in a misguided try and degrade the Ukrainian will to battle. Ukrainian Air Power Command reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched 70 cruise missiles and 5 drones at Ukrainian essential infrastructure targets.[1] Ukrainian Air Power Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 51 of the Russian cruise missiles and all 5 drones.[2] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings, thermal energy vegetation, and substations within the metropolis of Kyiv in addition to in Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Lviv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[3] Ukrainian, Russian, and social media sources claimed that Russian forces additionally struck targets in Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officers reported widespread disruptions to vitality, heating, and water provides on account of the Russian strikes.[5] ISW has beforehand assessed that the Russian army remains to be capable of assault Ukrainian essential infrastructure at scale within the close to time period regardless of persevering with to deplete its arsenal of high-precision weapons programs.[6] Ukrainian Deputy Protection Minister Hanna Malyar acknowledged that the Russian army mistakenly believes that the destruction of vitality infrastructure will direct Ukrainian efforts to guard rear areas and divert Ukrainian consideration away from the entrance in japanese and southern Ukraine.[7] Malyar acknowledged that Russia’s marketing campaign towards essential infrastructure won’t weaken the motivation of Ukraine’s civilian inhabitants, and the Ukrainian Safety and Protection Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov asserted that Russian missile and drone strikes won’t coerce Ukraine into negotiations.[8]

Distinguished Russian politicians proceed to advertise overtly genocidal rhetoric towards Ukraine. Moscow Metropolis Duma Deputy and pro-Kremlin journalist Andrey Medvedev posted an extended rant to his Telegram channel on November 23 whereby he categorically denied the existence of the Ukrainian nation, relegating Ukrainian identification to a “political orientation.”[9] Medvedev referred to as Ukraine a pagan cult of loss of life that worships prisoner executions and referred to as for the entire “liquidation of Ukrainian statehood in its present type.”[10] This rhetoric is overtly exterminatory and dehumanizing and requires the conduct of a genocidal battle towards the Ukrainian state and its folks, which notably has pervaded discourse within the highest ranges of the Russian political mainstream. As ISW has beforehand reported, Russian President Vladimir Putin has equally employed such genocidal language in a method that’s basically incompatible with requires negotiations.[11]

The Kremlin has not backed down from its maximalist targets of regaining management of Ukraine however is relatively partially obfuscating Russia’s goals to mislead Western international locations into pressuring Ukraine to sue for peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on November 21 that altering the present authorities in Ukraine will not be a objective of the Russian “particular army operation” in Ukraine, observing that Russian President Vladimir Putin “has already spoken about this.”[12] Putin had mentioned on October 26 that Ukraine has “misplaced its sovereignty” and are available totally underneath NATO’s management.[13] Putin’s speech on the Valdai Dialogue Membership on October 27 once more rejected Ukraine’s sovereignty, noting that Russia “created” Ukraine and that the “single actual assure of Ukrainian sovereignty” can solely be Russia.[14] Putin has additionally persistently upheld his speaking level that Ukraine is a Nazi state that have to be “denazified.”[15]  Putin’s calls for quantity to a requirement for regime change in Kyiv even when he doesn’t explicitly name for it in these latest statements. The truth that Peskov refers again to those feedback by Putin makes studying any critical walking-back of Russian goals into Peskov’s feedback extremely doubtful.

The Kremlin’s obfuscation of its goals probably supposed for a Western viewers is however complicated Russian battle supporters. Peskov’s assertion probably aimed to mitigate the consequences of Vice-Speaker of the Russian Federation Council Konstantin Kosachev’s pro-war rant declaring that Russia can solely normalize relations with Ukraine following the capitulation of the Ukrainian authorities.[16] The 2 contrasting statements confused the pro-war group. A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger sarcastically noticed that Russia is aimlessly combating a battle with no clear objective in response to Peskov’s assertion.[17] ISW has reported on comparable reactions to the Kremlin’s determination to change Ukrainian prisoners of battle from Mariupol, whom Kremlin officers and propagandists vilified as “Nazis” and ”battle criminals.”[18]

The Kremlin’s hesitance to publicly commit totally to an excessive nationalist ideology and to the battle can also be bewildering propagandists who preach such ideology to the Russian plenty. Russian political and army “consultants” on a Russian state TV present pushed again towards Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s declare that Kherson Oblast is totally Russian, which might justify the usage of nuclear weapons.[19] The “consultants” mentioned that the usage of nuclear weapons to defend territory that isn’t totally occupied is irrational and even mentioned that NATO poses no risk to Russia. Russian propagandists have been making outlandish nuclear threats and accusing NATO of planning to assault Russia all through Putin’s regime and particularly earlier than and in the course of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine; such dismissal of widespread Kremlin speaking factors in such a discussion board is unprecedented.[20] ISW has additionally beforehand reported that Russian excessive nationalist ideologist Alexander Dugin accused Putin of not totally committing to the pro-war ideology.[21] Putin has typically sought to steadiness excessive nationalist speaking factors to collect help from the nationalist-leaning group and a extra reasonable narrative to take care of the help of the remainder of the Russian inhabitants. Russian army failures and the rising sacrifices Putin is demanding of the Russian folks to proceed his disastrous invasion are bringing his deliberate obfuscation of battle goals and makes an attempt to steadiness rhetorically into sharp aid, probably fueling discontent inside essential constituencies.

Key Takeaways

  • The Russian army carried out one other set of large, coordinated missile strikes on Ukrainian essential infrastructure.
  • Russian politicians proceed to advertise overtly genocidal rhetoric towards Ukraine.
  • The Kremlin continues to pursue its maximalist targets and is probably going issuing imprecise statements about its intent to mislead Western Nations into pressuring Ukraine into negotiations.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations within the instructions of Kreminna and Svatove.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations round Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
  • Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) financial institution of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • The Kremlin is constant crypto-mobilization efforts on the expense of different Russian safety providers.
  • Russian forces and occupation officers continued to forcibly relocate residents and confiscate their property.

We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these experiences.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Japanese Ukraine
  • Russian Predominant Effort—Japanese Ukraine (comprised of 1 subordinate and one supporting effort);
  • Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort—Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts
  • Actions in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Japanese Ukraine: (Japanese Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)


Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations within the instructions of Svatove and Kreminna on November 23. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian artillery items thwarted a Ukrainian assault inside 14km northwest of Svatove within the path of Novoselivske.[22] A Russian milblogger posted movies purporting to indicate Russian forces hanging a Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage group within the path of Svatove.[23] The Russian MoD additionally claimed that Russian artillery items repelled a Ukrainian assault inside 6km northwest of Kreminna close to Chervonopopivka.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces tried the assault towards Chervonopopivka to chop a bit of the R-66 freeway that connects Kreminna to Svatove.[25] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating forces in Kharkiv Oblast in preparation for a potential main offensive towards Svatove. ISW doesn’t assess claims about future Ukrainian operations.[26]

Russian forces carried out restricted counterattacks aimed toward constraining the actions of Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces neutralized a Russian reconnaissance and sabotage group inside 47km northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Staritsa, Kharkiv Oblast.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out an assault inside 15km northwest of Svatove within the path of Stelmakhivka.[28] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces additionally repelled a Russian assault inside 12km south of Kreminna close to Bilohorivka.[29] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces continued routine oblique hearth alongside the road of contact in japanese Ukraine.[30]

Ukrainian forces continued to focus on Russian army concentrations and logistics in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a number of Russian manpower and gear concentrations and destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Luhansk Oblast within the earlier days.[31] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces killed about 50 Russian army personnel and wounded as much as 50 others within the strikes.[32]

 Russian Predominant Effort—Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations within the path of Bakhmut on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults close to Bakhmut, inside 14km south of Bakhmut close to Kurdiumivka, and inside 30km northeast of Bakhmut close to Spirne and Berestove.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group items are persevering with to aim to push by Ukrainian defensive positions on the outskirts of Bakhmut and that Russian forces carried out assaults inside 26km northeast of Bakhmut on Yakovlivka and Bilhorivka, Donetsk Oblast.[34] The milblogger additionally claimed that there’s fierce combating southeast of Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[35] Russian sources continued to say that Ukrainian forces are struggling heavy losses within the Bakhmut space however didn’t present particular info on mentioned losses.[36] Social media sources posted geolocated footage exhibiting Russian forces firing incendiary munitions close to Ukrainian positions close to Spirne.[37] Protocol III of the Geneva Conference prohibits the usage of air-delivered incendiary munitions towards army targets inside a focus of civilians.[38]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations within the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis space on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults inside 28km southwest of Avdiivka close to Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Sieverne, and Marinka, and inside 15km northwest of Avdiivka close to Novobakhmutivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces additionally carried out assaults southwest of Avdiivka close to Novomyhailivka and Opytne, and inside 6km northeast of Avdiivka close to Kamianka.[39] One other Russian milblogger posted geolocated footage exhibiting Russian forces making minimal advances in direction of Nevelske and claimed that the brand new positions would permit Russian artillery items to fireside on roads resulting in Krasnohorivka.[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance in Marinka, and social media sources posted geolocated footage exhibiting that Russian forces are making minimal advances.[41] One Russian supply argued that management of Marinka is of key significance for Russian efforts to seize the Vuhledar salient.[42] These Russian advances in Marinka are lower than 1km from the 2014 territorial boundaries in Donetsk Oblast and are the fruit of greater than 8 years of Russian army efforts.

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations in western Donetsk and japanese Zaporizhia oblasts on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces are on the defensive in these instructions.[43] The Russian Ministry of Protection claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault close to Pavlivka (52km southwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian artillery items have been holding again additional Russian offensive operations within the Pavlivka space.[45] Geolocated footage posted on November 23 reveals Ukrainian forces in Pavlivka regardless of repeated Russian claims that Russian forces have fully taken the settlement.[46] The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces continued routine oblique hearth alongside the road of contact in Donetsk and japanese Zaporizhia oblasts.[47]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)

Be aware: ISW will report on actions in Kherson Oblast as a part of the Southern Axis on this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has completed its acknowledged targets, so ISW won’t current a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive part till Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) financial institution of Kherson Oblast on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian troops within the Kherson path are conducting positional protection, bettering fortifications, and deploying further gear to defensive traces alongside the M14 (Kakhovka-Melitopol) freeway.[48] Satellite tv for pc imagery taken between November 2 and November 15 reveals the development of Russian fortifications north of Radensk, 25km southeast of Kherson Metropolis alongside the E97 freeway that runs between Kherson Metropolis and Armiansk, occupied Crimea.[49] Satellite tv for pc imagery additionally reveals the continued building of defensive positions, together with building supplies, infantry trenches, and support-line trenches close to Zaozerne, alongside the P47 Kakhovka-Henichesk route.[50] Russian forces reportedly struck Kherson Metropolis with incendiary munitions on November 23 and continued firing on settlements alongside the west (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River.[51] Russian forces carried out routine artillery strikes alongside the road of contact on western financial institution Kherson Oblast and in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued hanging Russian focus areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported {that a} Ukrainian strike destroyed a Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system close to Orikhiv, a checkpoint close to Vesele, and a personnel focus in Melitopol between November 21 and 23.[53] Russian milbloggers continued to warn in regards to the potential of an imminent Ukrainian offensive on the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[54]

Ukrainian nuclear energy firm Energoatom introduced on November 23 that because of a lower within the availability of vitality provide in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) went into full blackout mode and that each one diesel mills are in operation.[55] Energoatom’s assertion is underscored by discussions between Worldwide Atomic Power Company (IAEA) Director Common Rafael Grossi and Rosatom Director Common Alexey Likhachev in Istanbul, Turkey, to ascertain a nuclear security and safety safety zone across the ZNPP.[56] Rosatom notably continues to accuse Ukraine of shelling the plant, and Rosatom advisor Renat Karchaa claimed that Ukrainian artillery hearth broken distillate tanks between two of the ZNPP’s energy items between November 19 and 20.[57] Russian officers will probably proceed to conduct an info operation accusing Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP with a view to undermine makes an attempt at negotiations with the IAEA and consolidate Russian management of the plant.

Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)

The Kremlin continues its makes an attempt to handle pressure era points on the expense of different Russian safety providers and is constant crypto mobilization. A Russian milblogger reported that the Russian Armed Forces are coaching mobilized reservists of the Russian army police in North Ossetia, who will take part in fight in Ukraine.[58] Russian forces have additionally continued the compelled mobilization of males in proxy republics and have reportedly mobilized all males (together with these underneath 60 years of age) in Dovzhanska, Luhansk Oblast.[59] Russian milbloggers have shared video footage showcasing the early commencement of scholars from the Donetsk Metropolis Navy College in April 2022, noting that of these college students 12 have died and nearly all had been wounded in fight.[60] The milbloggers added that the category of 2023 will even graduate early. ISW beforehand reported that Russian officers have deliberate early graduations for cadets in Russia.[61] The Wagner Group has additionally continued to recruit personnel, with a number of distinguished milbloggers sharing recruitment adverts for a three-month-long ”enterprise journey” to Ukraine.[62]

Russian mobilized males and their households are persevering with to complain about mobilization points. Video footage confirmed Russian mobilized servicemen from Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast, complaining about mismanagement and poor management.[63] Mobilized males famous that the Russian command deserted them in Baranykivka, Luhansk Oblast, on the Svatove-Kreminna frontline with none instructions. Mobilized males added that on account of poor management, half of the unit ended up in Ukrainian-liberated Makiivka, west of Baranykivka. One other video confirmed mobilized males in Yekaterinburg interesting to town administration concerning the shortage of funds.[64] Russian parliamentarian Maksim Ivanov additionally claimed to obtain appeals from 537 households of mobilized males from Sverdlovsk Oblast concerning the shortage of promised funds.[65] Russian pro-war milbloggers additionally accused the native administration of spending cash on vacation decorations relatively than paying the mobilized.[66] Russian mobilization however continues to empty the budgets of native governments. Mayor of Naberzhnye Chelny Nayil Magdeyev promised to allocate half a billion rubles (about 10 million {dollars}) to help mobilized and their households for a six-month interval.[67] Such price range allocations for only one metropolis within the Republic of Tatarstan reveal the costliness of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization.

Russian mobilized males proceed to indicate indicators of low morale. Twenty mobilized males from the Republic of Mordovia reportedly didn’t return to a coaching floor in Ulyanovsk after their army command gave them a trip day for Russia’s Unity Day on November 4.[68] Russian sources additionally reported {that a} mobilized man from Saratov Oblast who had beforehand shared a video of poor residing situations after which publicly retracted his statements ended up in a psychiatric hospital.[69] The person reportedly instructed his household that different troopers wished to drown him and that he’s now in a drugged state.[70]

The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces are coaching operators for each Russian and Iranian-made UAVs in an academic establishment in Russian-occupied Sevastopol.[71] Russian forces are reportedly at present coaching 30 servicemen for 3 weeks. Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on November 23, and Ukrainian officers beforehand reported that Iran could assist Belarus produce artillery shells.[72]

Geolocated footage confirmed a Russian army buildup in Belgorod Oblast close to the worldwide border on November 9, however the footage could present broken and withdrawn Russian army gear from Kharkiv Oblast.[73] Social media customers geolocated two areas of army gear concentrations in Verigovka and Biriuch, about 25km northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Social media customers identified that a lot of the gear seems broken or in want of restore.

Exercise in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian goal: consolidate administrative management of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)

Russian forces and occupation officers continued the relocation of civilians and the confiscation of personal and public Ukrainian property on November 23. The Ukrainian Common Employees reported that Russian forces continued to forcibly resettle Ukrainian residents in Luhansk Oblast underneath the pretext of eliminating subversive actions and relocated at the very least 20 locals from Denezhnykove and Shtormove, Luhansk (about 25km northeast of Severodonetsk) to an unknown location.[74] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai additionally reported that Russian forces continued to evict residents from their homes and occupy deserted properties in Starobilsk Raion, Luhansk.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle notably reported that Russian forces continued to show instructional establishments in occupied territories into barracks because of an elevated want for barrack area in that space after the Russian withdrawal from Kherson Oblast.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that Russian forces occupy elements of instructional establishments whereas education schemes proceed to happen.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle additionally famous that Russian forces continued to deal with wounded Russian servicemembers in civilian hospitals in occupied territories.[78] These efforts could represent an effort to make use of civilians and civilian objects in occupied areas as human shields.

Russian occupation authorities continued in depth efforts to tighten social management and erode Ukrainian nationwide identification in occupied territories on November 23. Ukrainian Mariupol Metropolis advisor Andryushchenko reported that Russian occupying forces test schoolchildren’s belongings earlier than the schoolchildren enter faculty and require them to sing the Russian and Donetsk Folks’s Republic (DNR) anthems each morning.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported that occupation officers in Melitopol erected a monument in mid-November to Grigory Boyarinov, a Russian battle hero and Folks’s Commissariat for Inside Affairs (NKVD) worker who is thought for main the storming of Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin’s palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, and taking part in Amin’s assassination in 1979 at the beginning of the Soviet invasion.[80] The Ukrainian Resistance Middle reported on November 23 that Melitopol residents painted the monument black in protest.[81] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevheny Balitsky notably reported that Zaporizhia occupation authorities plan to hold out in depth nationalization of socially important Ukrainian objects and infrastructure in Zaporizhia Oblast. Balitsky acknowledged that occupation officers have recognized over 400 social objects that they plan to nationalize by the top of 2022 and famous that they’re at present engaged on a listing of a kids’s music faculty in Melitopol.[82] This plan basically legalizes the looting of Ukrainian property, consolidates administrative management of occupied areas, and contributes to the erosion of Ukrainian identification and tradition by subsuming socially-significant infrastructure into Russian programs.

Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in one other prisoner change on November 23.  Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces exchanged 35 Ukrainian servicemen and one Ukrainian civilian for 35 Russian servicemen and one Russian civilian.[83] Latvia-based impartial Russian language information company Meduza reported that, among the many Ukrainian servicemembers exchanged, a number of had been defenders of the Azovstal Plant in Mariupol and some had been Ukrainian Nationwide Guardsmen who defended the Chernobyl Nuclear Energy Plant within the early phases of the battle.[84]

Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.  




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[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/16384599

[13] Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, October 26 | Institute for the Research of Warfare (



[16] https://tass dot ru/politika/16382119














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[52];; https://tass dot ru/voennaya-operaciya-na-ukraine/16402429?;;

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[72]; www.president dot ir/fa/140914

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[76] https://sprotyv.mod dot

[77] https://sprotyv.mod dot

[78] https://sprotyv.mod dot


[80]; https://sprotyv.mod dot

[81] https://sprotyv.mod dot


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[84] https://meduza [dot] io/information/2022/11/23/ukraina-i-rossiya-obmenyalis-voennoplennymi-v-ukrainu-vernulis-36-chelovek-v-rossiyu-35

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