9 months into Russia’s newest invasion of Ukraine, the end result of the conflict stays unclear. The Russian army seems incapable of taking Kyiv or occupying a significant portion of the nation. Ukrainian forces have loved three months of success on the battlefield and will properly proceed to make progress in regaining territory. The conflict additionally might settle right into a extra drawn-out battle, with neither facet able to making a decisive breakthrough within the close to time period.
Projecting the last word end result of the conflict is difficult. Nonetheless, some main ramifications for Russia and its relations with Ukraine, Europe, and the US have come into focus. Whereas the conflict has been a tragedy for Ukraine and Ukrainians, it has additionally confirmed a catastrophe for Russia — militarily, economically, and geopolitically. The conflict has badly broken Russia’s army and tarnished its status, disrupted the economic system, and profoundly altered the geopolitical image going through Moscow in Europe. It would make any near-term restoration of a level of normalcy in U.S.-Russian relations troublesome, if not unattainable, to realize.
Russia’s conflict towards Ukraine
This newest section in hostilities between Russia and Ukraine started on February 24, 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin directed his forces to launch a significant, multi-prong invasion of Ukraine. The broad scope of the assault, which Putin termed a “particular army operation,” advised that Moscow’s goals had been to shortly seize Kyiv, presumably deposing the federal government, and occupy as a lot because the japanese half to two-thirds of the nation.
The Russian military gained floor in southern Ukraine, however it didn’t take Kyiv. By late March, Russian forces had been in retreat within the north. Moscow proclaimed its new goal as occupying all of Donbas, consisting of the oblasts (areas) of Luhansk and Donetsk, some 35% of which had already been occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces in 2014 and 2015. After three months of grinding battle, Russian forces captured virtually all of Luhansk, however they made little progress in Donetsk, and the battlelines appeared to stabilize in August.
In September, the Ukrainian military launched two counteroffensives. One within the northeast expelled Russian forces from Kharkiv oblast and pressed assaults into Luhansk oblast. Within the south, the second counteroffensive succeeded in November in driving Russian forces out of Kherson metropolis and the neighboring area, the one space that Russian forces occupied east of the Dnipro River, which roughly bisects Ukraine.
Regardless of three months of battlefield setbacks, Moscow has proven no indication of readiness to barter critically to finish the conflict. Certainly, on September 30, Putin introduced that Russia was annexing Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, despite the fact that Russian forces didn’t absolutely management that territory and constantly misplaced floor there within the following weeks. The Russian army made up for battlefield losses by rising missile assaults on Ukrainian cities, aimed particularly at disrupting electrical energy and central heating.
As of late November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his authorities insisted on circumstances that included Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory (together with Crimea and all of Donbas), compensation, and punishment for conflict crimes. Whereas these are comprehensible calls for given what Ukraine has gone via, reaching them would show troublesome. Nonetheless, Kyiv appeared assured that it might liberate extra territory whilst winter approached.
After 9 months of preventing, the Russian army has proven itself incapable of seizing and holding a big a part of Ukraine. Whereas the conflict’s end result is unsure, nevertheless the battle ends, a sovereign and impartial Ukrainian state will stay on the map of Europe. Furthermore, it will likely be bigger than the rump state that the Kremlin envisaged when it launched the February invasion.
Whether or not the Ukrainian army can drive the Russians utterly out or not less than again to the strains as of February 23 can be unclear. Some army specialists imagine that is doable, together with the complete liberation of Donbas and Crimea. Others supply much less optimistic projections. The U.S. intelligence neighborhood has forecast that the preventing might drag on and turn into a conflict of attrition.
Forging a hostile neighbor
At present, most Ukrainians regard Russia as an enemy.
Of all of the items of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union that Moscow misplaced when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, no half meant extra to Russians than Ukraine. The 2 international locations’ histories, cultures, languages, and religions had been intently intertwined. When the creator served on the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv on the finish of the Nineties, most Ukrainians held both a optimistic or ambivalent view relating to Russia. That has modified. At present, most Ukrainians regard Russia as an enemy.
Putin’s conflict has been calamitous for Ukraine. The exact variety of army and civilians casualties is unknown however substantial. The Workplace of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that, as of the tip of October, some 6,500 Ukrainian civilians had been killed and one other 10,000 injured. These numbers virtually definitely understate the fact. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees Basic Mark Milley on November 10 put the variety of civilian useless at 40,000 and indicated that some 100,000 Ukrainian troopers had been killed or wounded (Milley gave an identical quantity for Russian casualties, a subject addressed later on this paper).
As well as, the U.N. Excessive Commissioner for Refugees positioned the variety of Ukrainians who’ve sought refuge outdoors of Ukraine at greater than 7.8 million as of November 8. As of mid-November, the Russian assaults had precipitated an estimated 6.5 million extra to turn into internally displaced individuals inside Ukraine.
In addition to the human losses, the conflict has precipitated immense materials injury. Estimates of the prices of rebuilding Ukraine run from $349 billion to $750 billion, and people value determinations date again to the summer season. Discovering these funds won’t be simple, significantly because the conflict has resulted in a big contraction of the Ukrainian economic system; the World Financial institution expects the nation’s gross home product to shrink by 35% this yr.
All this has understandably affected Ukrainian attitudes. It has deepened the sense of Ukrainian nationwide id. An August ballot confirmed 85% self-identifying as Ukrainian residents versus folks of some area or ethnic minority; solely 64% did so six months earlier — earlier than Russia’s invasion. The invasion has additionally imbued Ukrainians with a strongly destructive view of Russia: The ballot confirmed 92% holding a “dangerous” perspective relating to Russia versus solely 2% with a “good” perspective.
Ukrainians have made clear their resolve to withstand. A September Gallup ballot reported 70% of Ukrainians decided to struggle till victory over Russia. A mid-October Kyiv Worldwide Institute of Sociology ballot had 86% supporting the conflict and opposing negotiations with Russia, regardless of Russian missile assaults towards Ukrainian cities.
It would take years, if not many years, to beat the enmity towards Russia and Russians engendered by the conflict. One Ukrainian journalist predicted final summer season that, after the conflict’s finish, Ukraine would witness a nationwide effort to “cancel” Russian tradition, e.g., cities and cities throughout the nation would rename their Pushkin Squares. It has already begun; Odesa intends to dismantle its statue of Catherine the Nice, the Russian empress who based the town in 1794.
Mockingly for an invasion launched partly because of Kremlin concern that Ukraine was transferring away from Russia and towards the West, the conflict has opened a beforehand closed path for Ukraine’s membership within the European Union (EU). For years, EU officers concluded agreements with Kyiv, together with the 2014 EU-Ukraine Affiliation Settlement. Nonetheless, EU officers averted language that might give Ukraine a membership perspective. In June, 4 months after Russia’s invasion, the European Council acknowledged Ukraine’s European perspective and gave it the standing of candidate nation. Kyiv will want years to satisfy the EU’s requirements, however it now has a membership perspective that it lacked for the primary 30 years of its post-Soviet independence.
As for NATO, 10 alliance members have expressed assist for a membership path for Ukraine, 9 in central Europe plus Canada. Different allies have usually remained silent or noncommittal, reflecting the truth that many, whereas ready to supply Ukraine monetary and army help, are usually not ready to go to conflict with Russia to defend Ukraine. Despite the fact that Kyiv can’t anticipate membership or a membership motion plan any time quickly, it should have continued NATO assist in its struggle towards Russia and, as soon as the conflict is over, assist in constructing a contemporary and strong army to discourage a Russian assault sooner or later.
The Kremlin has sought for the reason that finish of the Soviet Union to maintain Ukraine certain in a Russian sphere of affect. From that perspective, the final 9 years of Russian coverage have been an abysmal failure. Nothing has accomplished greater than that coverage to push Ukraine away from Russia and towards the West, or to advertise Ukrainian hostility towards Russia and Russians.
A catastrophe for Russia’s army and economic system
Whereas a tragedy for Ukraine, Putin’s determination to go to conflict has additionally confirmed a catastrophe for Russia.
Whereas a tragedy for Ukraine, Putin’s determination to go to conflict has additionally confirmed a catastrophe for Russia. The Russian army has suffered vital personnel and army losses. Financial sanctions imposed by the EU, United States, United Kingdom, and different Western international locations have pushed the Russian economic system into recession and threaten longer-term impacts, together with on the nation’s vital vitality sector.
In November, Milley put the variety of useless and wounded Russian troopers at 100,000, and that would fall on the low facet. A Pentagon official stated in early August Russian casualties numbered 70,000-80,000. That was greater than three months in the past, and people months have proven no kindness to the Russian military. Stories recommend that newly-mobilized and ill-trained Russian items have been decimated in fight.
The Russian army has misplaced vital quantities of apparatus. The Oryx web site studies 8,000 items of apparatus destroyed, broken, deserted, or captured, together with some 1,500 tanks, 700 armored preventing autos, and 1,700 infantry preventing autos. Oryx advises that its numbers considerably understate the true nature of Russian losses, because it counts solely tools for which it has distinctive photograph or videographic proof of its destiny. Others report a lot heavier losses. U.S. Secretary of Protection Lloyd Austin commented that the Russian army had misplaced “staggering” numbers of tanks and different armored autos, including that Western commerce restrictions on microchips would inhibit manufacturing of replacements.
On account of these losses, Russia has had to attract on reserves, together with T-64 tanks first produced almost 50 years in the past. It reportedly has turned to tanks from Belarus to replenish its losses. To enhance its personal munitions, Russia has needed to buy assault drones from Iran and artillery shells from North Korea. Because the Russian army has drawn down shares of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, it has used S-300 anti-aircraft missiles towards floor targets. The Russian protection price range will want years to switch what the army has misplaced or in any other case expended in Ukraine.
Poor management, poor techniques, poor logistics, and underwhelming efficiency towards a smaller and fewer well-armed foe have left Russia’s army status in a shambles. That may have an effect. Over the previous decade, Russian weapons exporters noticed their share of worldwide arms exports drop by 26%. International locations trying to purchase weapons possible will start to show elsewhere, provided that Russia’s army didn’t dominate early within the conflict, when its largely modernized forces confronted a Ukrainian army armed primarily with ageing Soviet-era tools (that started to alter solely in the summertime, when shares of heavy weapons started arriving from the West).
As Russia went to conflict, its economic system was largely stagnant; whereas it recorded a post-COVID-19 enhance in 2021, common actual revenue fell by 10% between 2013 and 2020. It would worsen. The West has utilized a bunch of financial sanctions on the nation. Whereas the Russian Central Financial institution’s actions have mitigated the worst impacts, the Russian economic system nonetheless contracted by 5% year-on-year in comparison with September 2021. The Group for Financial Cooperation and Improvement expects Russia’s economic system to contract by 3.9% in 2022 and 5.6% in 2023, and a confidential examine supposedly accomplished for the Kremlin projected an “inertial” case through which the economic system bottomed out solely in 2023 at 8.3% under 2021. One economist notes that the West’s cut-off of chips and microelectronics has devastated vehicle, plane, and weapons manufacturing, with the output of vehicles falling by 90% between March and September; he expects a long term of stagnation.
Along with dealing with the lack of high-tech and different key imports, the Russian economic system faces mind drain, significantly within the IT sector, that started in February in addition to the departure of greater than 1,000 Western firms. It additionally has a broader labor pressure problem. The army has mobilized 300,000 males, and the September mobilization order prompted a brand new flood of Russians leaving the nation, with greater than 200,000 going to Kazakhstan. Some estimates recommend a number of hundred thousand others have fled to different international locations. Taken collectively, meaning one thing like three-quarters of 1,000,000 males unavailable to work within the economic system.
Russia to this point has staved off harsher financial difficulties partly due to its oil and gasoline exports and excessive vitality costs. Excessive costs have partially offset the decline in quantity of oil and gasoline exports. Which will quickly change, not less than for oil. The EU banned the acquisition of Russian crude oil starting on December 5, and the West is prohibiting delivery Russian oil on Western-flagged tankers or insuring tankers that transfer Russian oil if the oil is offered above a sure value, now set at $60 per barrel. The worth cap — if it really works as deliberate — might lower sharply into the revenues that Russian oil exports generate. The cap would require that Russian exporters low cost the value of oil that they promote; the upper the low cost, the much less income that may movement to Russia.
Weaning Europe off of Russian gasoline poses a tougher problem, however EU international locations have made progress by switching to imports of liquefied pure gasoline (LNG). Furthermore, European firms have discovered methods to chop vitality use; for instance, 75% of German corporations that use gasoline report that they’ve diminished gasoline consumption with out having to chop manufacturing. EU international locations face a significantly better vitality image this winter than anticipated a number of months in the past. If Europe efficiently ends its import of Russian piped pure gasoline, that may pose a significant drawback for Gazprom, Russia’s massive gasoline exporter. Gazprom’s gasoline exports transfer largely by pipeline, and Gazprom’s gasoline pipeline construction is oriented primarily towards transferring gasoline from the western Siberian and Yamal gasoline fields to Europe. New pipelines can be wanted to modify the movement of that gasoline to Asia. If Europe can kick the Russian gasoline behavior, Gazprom will see a big decline in its export volumes, until it could construct new pipelines to Asian markets and/or tremendously increase its LNG export capability, all of which will likely be costly.
An additional drawback going through Russia’s vitality sector is that, as present oil and gasoline fields are depleted, Russian vitality firms should develop new fields to maintain manufacturing ranges. Lots of the potential new fields are within the Arctic area or off-shore and would require billions — possible, tens of billions — of {dollars} of funding. Russian vitality firms, nevertheless, will not be capable of depend on Western vitality firms for technical experience, expertise, or capital. That may hinder future manufacturing of oil and gasoline, as present fields turn into exhausted.
One other potential financial price looms. The West has frozen greater than $300 billion in Russian Central Financial institution reserves. As damages in Ukraine mount, strain will develop to grab some or all of those property for a Ukraine reconstruction fund. Western governments to this point present little enthusiasm for the thought. That stated, it’s troublesome to see how they may flip to their taxpayers for cash to help Ukraine’s rebuilding whereas leaving the Russian Central Financial institution funds intact and/or releasing these funds again to Russia.
Western sanctions didn’t produce the fast crash within the ruble or the broader Russian economic system that some anticipated. Nonetheless, their influence might imply a stagnant economic system in the long run, they usually threaten to trigger explicit issues within the vitality sector and different sectors that rely upon high-tech inputs imported from the West. Moscow doesn’t seem to have helpful solutions to those issues.
Modified geopolitics in Europe
In 2021, Moscow noticed a West that was divided and preoccupied with home politics. America was recovering from 4 years of the Trump presidency, post-Brexit politics in Britain remained tumultuous, Germany confronted September elections to decide on the primary chancellor in 16 years not named Angela Merkel, and France had a presidential election in early 2022. That possible affected Putin’s determination to launch his February invasion. Within the occasion, NATO and the EU responded shortly and in a unified method, and the invasion has prompted a dramatic reordering of the geopolitical scene in Europe. European international locations have come to see Russia in a threatening gentle, paying homage to how they seen the Soviet Union on the top of the Chilly Battle. NATO’s June 2022 summit assertion was all about deterrence and protection with regard to Russia, with none of earlier summits’ language on areas of cooperation.
Few issues epitomize the change greater than the Zeitenwende (turning-point) in German coverage. Within the days following the Russian invasion, Berlin agreed to sanctions on Russian banks that few anticipated the Germans to approve, reversed a long-standing ban on exporting weapons to battle zones with a view to present arms to Ukraine, established a 100-billion-euro ($110 billion) fund for its personal rearmament, and introduced the acquisition of American dual-capable F-35 fighters to maintain the German Air Pressure’s nuclear supply function. Simply days earlier than the assault, the German authorities stated it might cease certification of the Nord Stream 2 gasoline pipeline. Berlin’s follow-up has been bumpy and, at occasions, seemingly half-hearted, which has annoyed a lot of its companions. Nonetheless, in a couple of quick weeks in late February and early March, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition authorities erased 5 many years of German engagement with Moscow.
Different NATO members have additionally accelerated their protection spending. In accordance with NATO Secretary Basic Jens Stoltenberg, European allies and Canada have boosted protection spending by a complete of $350 billion in comparison with ranges in 2014, when the alliance — following Russia’s seizure of Crimea — set the objective for every member of two% of gross home product dedicated to protection by 2024. Stoltenberg added that 9 members had met the two% objective whereas 10 others meant to take action by 2024. Poland plans to boost its protection spending to three% subsequent yr, and different allies have advised the three% goal as properly.
Moscow didn’t just like the small multinational battlegroups that NATO deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland starting in 2017. Every numbered some 1,000-1,500 troops (battalion-sized) and had been described as “tripwire” forces. Since February, NATO has deployed further battlegroups in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia and selected a extra strong ahead presence, together with brigade-sized items, whereas enhancing capabilities for reinforcement. The U.S. army presence in Europe and European waters has grown from 80,000 service personnel to 100,000 and contains deployment of two F-35 squadrons to Britain, extra destroyers to be homeported in Spain, and a everlasting headquarters unit in Poland.
Along with bigger troop deployments, the Baltic Sea has seen a geopolitical earthquake. Finland and Sweden, which lengthy pursued insurance policies of neutrality, utilized to affix NATO in Might and accomplished accession protocols in July. They’ve vital army capabilities. Their accession to the alliance, anticipated in early 2023, will make the Baltic Sea successfully a NATO lake, leaving Russia with simply restricted entry from the tip of the Gulf of Finland and its Kaliningrad exclave.
In early 2014, NATO deployed just about no floor fight forces in international locations that had joined the alliance after 1997. That started altering after Russia’s seizure of Crimea. The current invasion has additional energized NATO and resulted in its enlargement by two further members. As Russia has drawn down forces reverse NATO international locations (and Finland) with a view to deploy them to Ukraine, the NATO army presence on Russia’s western flank has elevated.
The Kremlin has waged a two-front conflict this yr, preventing on the battlefield towards Ukraine whereas looking for to undermine Western monetary and army assist for Kyiv. The Russians are dropping on each fronts.
The Kremlin has waged a two-front conflict this yr, preventing on the battlefield towards Ukraine whereas looking for to undermine Western monetary and army assist for Kyiv. The Russians are dropping on each fronts. The Russian army has been dropping floor to the Ukrainian military and has carried out a marketing campaign of missile strikes towards energy, warmth, and water utilities within the nation, which threatens a humanitarian disaster. A lot will rely upon how dangerous the winter is, however Ukrainians have proven outstanding resilience in restoring utilities, and the Russian assaults might additional harden their resolve. Furthermore, the brutality of the Russian missile marketing campaign has already led Ukraine’s Western supporters to present Kyiv extra subtle air defenses, and pressures might develop to supply different weapons as properly.
As for the second entrance, regardless of excessive vitality costs, having to deal with the vast majority of the almost eight million Ukrainians who’ve left their nation, and considerations over how lengthy the preventing would possibly final, European assist for Ukraine has not slackened. Russian hints of nuclear escalation precipitated concern however didn’t weaken European assist for Ukraine, and Moscow has markedly deescalated the nuclear rhetoric in current weeks. Given Russia’s relationship with China, the Kremlin definitely seen Chinese language President Xi Jinping’s current criticism of nuclear threats.
It seems Moscow’s affect elsewhere is slipping, together with amongst post-Soviet states. Kazakhstan has boosted its protection spending by greater than 50%. In June, on a stage with Putin in St. Petersburg, its president pointedly declined to comply with Russia’s lead in recognizing the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk “folks’s republics” as impartial states. Neither Kazakhstan nor another member of the Russian-led Collective Safety Treaty Group (CSTO) — or another post-Soviet state, for that matter — has acknowledged Russia’s claimed annexations of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. In a outstanding scene at an October Russia-Central Asia summit, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon overtly challenged Putin for his lack of respect for Central Asian international locations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoiled a late November CSTO summit; he refused to signal a leaders’ declaration and noticeably moved away from Putin throughout the summit photograph op.
Extra broadly, in October, the U.N. Basic Meeting permitted a decision calling for rejection — and demanding reversal — of Moscow’s unlawful annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts by a vote of 143-5 (35 abstaining). A current article documented how Russia has discovered its candidates rejected and its participation suspended in a string of U.N. organizations, together with the Worldwide Telecommunications Union, Human Rights Council, Financial and Social Council, and Worldwide Civil Aviation Group. Putin selected to not attend the November G-20 summit in Bali, possible reflecting his expectation that different leaders would have snubbed him and refused to satisfy bilaterally, in addition to the criticism he would have encountered in multilateral periods. The summit produced a leaders’ declaration that, whereas noting “different views,” leveled a harsh critique at Moscow for its conflict on Ukraine.
A deep freeze with Washington
Whereas U.S.-Russian relations had fallen to a post-Chilly Battle low level in 2020, the June 2021 summit that U.S. President Joe Biden held with Putin gave a modest optimistic impulse to the connection. U.S. and Russian officers that fall broadened bilateral diplomatic contacts and gave a optimistic evaluation to the strategic stability dialogue, terming the exchanges “intensive and substantive.” Furthermore, Washington noticed a doable drop-off in malicious cyber exercise originating from Russia. Nonetheless, the Russian invasion prompted a deep freeze within the relationship, and Washington made clear that enterprise as standard was off the desk.
U.S. Nationwide Safety Advisor Jake Sullivan, U.S. Protection Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees Mark Milley, and CIA Director Invoice Burns nonetheless have saved channels open to their Russian counterparts. These strains of communication search to keep away from miscalculation — significantly miscalculation that would result in a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia conflict — and scale back danger. However different channels stay largely unused. Burns’s November 14 assembly with Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Russian exterior intelligence service, was probably the most senior face-to-face assembly between U.S. and Russian officers in 9 months. Biden and Putin haven’t spoken immediately with each other since February, and that relationship appears irretrievably damaged.
In a optimistic glimmer, Biden instructed the U.N. Basic Meeting “It doesn’t matter what else is going on on this planet, the US is able to pursue vital arms management measures.” Talking in June, the Kremlin spokesperson stated “we have an interest [in such talks]… Such talks are essential.” U.S. officers have privately indicated that, whereas they’ve conditions for resuming the strategic dialogue, progress on ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict will not be one in all them. This leaves room for some hope that, regardless of their present adversarial relationship, Washington and Moscow should still share an curiosity in containing their competitors in nuclear arms.
Past that, nevertheless, it’s troublesome to see a lot prospect for motion towards a level of normalcy within the broader U.S.-Russia relationship. With Moscow turning to Iran and North Korea for weapons, Washington can’t depend on Russian assist in attempting to convey Tehran again into the nuclear deal (the 2015 Joint Complete Plan of Motion) or to extend strain on North Korea to finish its missile launches and to not conduct one other nuclear check. Likewise, coordination on Syria is much less possible. It might be that any significant enchancment within the general bilateral relationship requires Putin’s departure from the Kremlin. A second requirement could possibly be that Putin’s successor undertake coverage modifications to display that Russia is altering course and ready to dwell in peace with its neighbors.
What occurs will rely upon how the Russian elite and public view his efficiency; whereas some indicators of disaffection over the conflict have emerged, it’s too early to forecast their which means for Putin’s political longevity.
This doesn’t imply to advocate a coverage of regime change in Russia. That’s past U.S. capabilities, particularly given the opacity of in the present day’s Kremlin. U.S. coverage ought to stay one in all looking for a change in coverage, not regime. That stated, the prospects for enhancing U.S.-Russian relations seem slim whereas Putin stays in cost. What occurs will rely upon how the Russian elite and public view his efficiency; whereas some indicators of disaffection over the conflict have emerged, it’s too early to forecast their which means for Putin’s political longevity.
Nonetheless, whereas it stays troublesome to foretell the end result of the conflict or the influence it might have on Putin’s time within the Kremlin, there’s little doubt that the preventing with Ukraine and its ramifications will depart Russia diminished in vital methods. It should deal with a badly-damaged army that may take years to reconstitute; years of possible financial stagnation lower off from key high-tech imports; a probably worsening scenario with regard to vitality exports and future manufacturing; an alarmed, alienated, and rearming Europe; and a rising political isolation that may depart Moscow much more depending on its relationship with China. Putin nonetheless appears to cling to his want of “regaining” a part of Ukraine, which he considers “historic Russian land.” However the prices of that for Russia mount by the day.
