Weapons Losses Fueling Africa’s Militant Teams – Africa Heart for Strategic Research


Lack of munitions and different deadly materiel from African armed forces and peace operations is a key issue sustaining militant teams driving instability on the continent.

Weapons and an armored car at a MIMUSMA outpost in northern Mali. (Photograph: MINUSMA/Harandane Dicko)

Inside a single week in February 2021, militants from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) overran Nigerian navy bases within the cities of Marte and Dikwa in Borno State. Greater than 20 troopers have been killed within the assaults. The militants doubtless seized at the very least half a dozen autos and tons of of weapons. The incidents have been important however unexceptional.

“Nonstate armed teams have repeatedly focused and overrun peacekeepers and nationwide armed forces to grab deadly and nonlethal materiel.”

Contingent-owned tools (COE) loss has develop into a essential vulnerability for nationwide armies and peace operations in Africa. Nonstate armed teams have repeatedly focused and overrun peacekeepers and nationwide armed forces to grab deadly and nonlethal materiel. This materiel represents a major supply of armaments for Africa’s militant teams, fueling instability on the continent.

As a part of its “Silencing the Weapons” initiative (now prolonged by means of 2030), the African Union Fee acknowledged COE loss from peace operations as a major downside in a joint research with the Small Arms Survey. The first sources of illicit weapons in Africa, in keeping with the research, embrace nationwide stockpiles and peacekeeping forces. These weapons diversions are largely as a result of battlefield loss, mismanagement, theft, and corruption.

This immediately contributes to the capability of violent extremist teams. Al Shabaab has secured important deadly materiel from assaults on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as have the Macina Liberation Entrance (FLM) and different armed teams from the UN Multidimensional Built-in Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Joint Power of the Group of 5 for the Sahel (FC-G5S).

Weapons and ammunition eastern DRC

Weapons and ammunition collected from armed teams in jap Democratic Republic of Congo.
(Photograph: MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti)

COE loss has occurred in at the very least 20 peace operations in 18 African nations. Deadly materiel misplaced prior to now 10 years alone has included many hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, 1000’s of small arms and lightweight weapons, and sure tons of of heavy weapons programs. Nonlethal materiel, resembling unarmed autos and bikes, uniforms, communications tools, and gas, have additionally persistently been a goal. Armed teams use this materiel in opposition to peacekeepers and armed forces in advanced ambushes perpetuating the cycle of munitions loss.

For broadly differing causes the European Union (EU), China, and Russia seem set to extend their provide of deadly materiel to African governments. Except COE management measures are strengthened, these arms flows might contribute to larger instability.

Deadly Materiel Loss within the Lake Chad Basin

Assaults on safety forces by Boko Haram and ISWA within the Lake Chad Basin underscore the seriousness of this problem. These teams have sustained their insurgencies for years using huge quantities of COE seized from the armed forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Army bases throughout the Lake Chad Basin have been attacked and looted. Boko Haram and ISWA have additionally secured deadly materiel from safety forces in transit throughout assaults in opposition to patrols, convoys (each of provides and troop actions), and through escort duties.

The Safeguarding Safety Sector Stockpiles (S4) Knowledge Set has recorded greater than 700 reported assaults in opposition to the Multinational Joint Job Power (MNJTF) and adjoining navy items since 2015. The MNJTF consists of roughly 10,000 troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. Further safety forces from Lake Chad’s 4 riparian nations are additionally deployed all through the MNJTF’s space of accountability (AOR).

Map - Arms Losses in the Lake Chad Basin

Regardless of this important presence of navy personnel, Boko Haram and ISWA have efficiently attacked quite a few mounted websites within the space. Sections have been focused at checkpoints. Platoons have been focused at outposts. Firms have been focused at ahead working bases. Battalions have been focused at sector headquarters. And dozens of supposedly safe websites, each small and enormous, have been overrun and their shops looted.

Such seizures of weapons programs and ammunition have allowed militants within the Lake Chad Basin to maintain their up-tempo operations. Whereas these teams produce some handmade small arms and acquire a restricted provide of deadly materiel on illicit markets, the insurgencies persist largely with out exterior assist. Boko Haram and ISWA, furthermore, haven’t restricted their seizures to small arms and lightweight weapons. They’ve additionally seized artillery and quite a few armored autos.

Table - Heavy Weapons Systems Seized by Boko Haram and ISWA since 2015

Particulars on the standing, illicit procurement strategies, and portions of materiel holdings listed above are tough to confirm. Governments have causes to disclaim and obfuscate losses, and armed teams have causes to overstate their seizures. Knowledge collected from open-source reporting recommend an incomplete snapshot that’s doubtless solely a fraction of precise losses.

Nonlethal materiel seized from Lake Chad Basin governments—resembling uniforms, communications tools, civilian autos—has additionally had severe ramifications for pressure safety. Militant teams have used civilian autos as vehicle-borne improvised explosive units. Moreover, they’ve used captured navy autos and uniforms to camouflage their actions and improve the effectiveness of their assaults by making their targets much less vigilant.

Diversion of Arms and Ammunition from Different Peace Operations

Different peace operations and armed forces have skilled losses of deadly materiel to militant teams in circumstances much like the MNJTF.

This downside is neither distinctive to Africa nor to African police- and troop-contributing nations (P/TCCs). For instance, many European nations misplaced appreciable materiel—together with armored autos—within the UN missions in former Yugoslavia within the Nineteen Nineties. Asian and South American P/TCCs have skilled  losses of arms and ammunition in peace operations within the Caribbean, the Center East, and Asia. However given the variety of peace operations undertaken in Africa—and the big variety of African nations taking part in peace operations on the continent—losses of deadly materiel are a problem that calls for the eye of African policymakers and safety professionals.

“Poor practices concerning weapons and ammunition administration stay a severe concern throughout the continent.”

Lack of tools doesn’t recommend {that a} particular P/TCC lacks capability or doesn’t take its mission severely. Peacekeeping is tough and uniformed personnel deployed on these missions usually face grave dangers. Many African P/TCCs have earned reputations as efficient peacekeepers and misplaced forces after coming beneath assault.

However, poor practices concerning weapons and ammunition administration stay a severe concern throughout the continent. Inoperable or inadequate tools, endemic corruption, diminished morale, and lapses in battle readiness are sometimes the first reason for COE loss. Insufficient perimeter safety practices in addition to the dearth of coaching, efficient normal working procedures, oversight mechanisms, and accountability requirements additional exacerbate the scenario.

Studies from troopers are rife with accounts of being insufficiently outfitted with physique armor, ammunition, and different provides. Corrupt procurement practices are additionally widespread and assist clarify why materiel is usually briefly provide. Withholding wages and advantages, and longer-than-anticipated deployment lengths all have detrimental results on morale and esprit de corps.

Present Conventions and Frameworks

Policymakers and practitioners inside the arms management and peace operations communities have more and more acknowledged the essential significance of mitigating COE loss.

The Financial Neighborhood of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Financial Neighborhood of Central African States (ECCAS), for instance, have legally binding arms management conventions—with express references to peace operations—that entered into pressure in 2009 and 2017, respectively. Their 26 member states symbolize a few of the most energetic P/TCCs in UN and African peace missions.

AU armored personnel carrier

An African Union armored personnel provider in Somalia.
(Photograph: Sufficient/Laura Heaton)

The reporting necessities for ECOWAS and ECCAS present management measures that ought to be aggressively employed. For instance, the ECOWAS conference stipulates that its 15 members report all small arms and lightweight weapons—together with their elements, equipment, and ammunition—that they contribute. Furthermore, they’re to report what they resupply, get well, or destroy throughout their deployment. Sadly, these procedures are usually not uniformly upheld. If this conference have been rigorously adhered to, the secretariat’s accountability and inquiry course of could be rather more efficient.

Small arms management frameworks of the Regional Centre on Small Arms within the Nice Lakes Area, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) and the Southern African Improvement Neighborhood (SADC) ought to be strengthened. They comprise provisions for the disposal of confiscated or unlicensed firearms that, if extra successfully employed, might assist counter the recirculation of recovered deadly materiel in such missions. Their protocols, nevertheless, shouldn’t have express procedures for weapons and ammunition administration in peace operations, leaving a blind spot.

Enhancing on Current Apply

Present practices have didn’t stem the movement of deadly materiel to the armed teams that troopers and peacekeepers confront on the battlefield. With out significant change, offering extra weapons to states combatting nonstate armed teams could exacerbate battle relatively than resolve it. Degrading and stopping militant teams’ capability to divert COE would require efforts and sources on the tactical, operational, and strategic ranges.

On the bottom, tactical changes for higher pressure and tools safety are important to stop battlefield losses. P/TCCs want to reinforce perimeter safety for his or her mounted websites. Troopers should be extra conscious and reply extra ably to an enemy practiced within the artwork of deception (resembling driving in captured military autos and sporting official uniforms). The design and implementation of berms and roadblocks will be achieved inexpensively, as can coaching of sentries chargeable for distinguishing pal from foe.

“Tactical changes for higher pressure and tools safety are important to stop battlefield losses.”

In sure contested contexts, missions could profit from limiting mounted defenses and static positions, which permit troop actions to be continually monitored. Cellular items on near-constant patrol restrict vulnerabilities related to everlasting basing methods and may enhance safety of civilians and peacekeeping forces by masking a larger space. Working from a cellular posture does current logistical challenges for resupply. Nevertheless, these will be overcome with larger funding in and an expanded function for navy logistics items chargeable for provide, transportation out and in the AOR, upkeep and restore, and their very own self-sustainment functionality.

As a result of illicit small arms and lightweight weapons already flow into within the conflict-affected areas, mission mandates ought to embrace interventions geared toward severing illicit firearm sources by means of pre-deployment measures. These embrace:

  • Mission-specific coaching in weapons and ammunitions administration
  • Marking and digital document maintaining of all weapons
  • Efficient administration or destruction of all recovered small arms and lightweight weapons

Equally, African skilled navy training establishments have a job to play. Core curricula at navy academies and specialised programs at command and employees schools in addition to battle and protection schools want to emphasise pressure safety and logistics throughout the continent.

P/TCCs can additional enhance on weapons and ammunition administration inside current sources by means of adjustment to operational insurance policies. Clamping down on corruption will improve procurement plans with out growing protection budgets. Rotating uniformed personnel out of battle zones inside their anticipated intervals of service will improve morale. Better transparency and constancy to cost and profit schemes will cut back troops’ proclivity to divert or abandon materiel.

AK-47 magazines in North Kivu

AK-47 magazines collected in North Kivu, DRC.
(Photograph: UN/Martine Perret)

Strategically, African and worldwide organizations ought to take fuller benefit of current arms management frameworks throughout the continent such because the ECOWAS and ECCAS conventions. Making use of the management measures in these conventions extra robustly and uniformly would supply enhanced oversight and professionalism. Furthermore, doing so would assist FC-G5S and MNJTF, that are new to peace operations and shouldn’t have their very own arms management protocols.

The AU also needs to make the most of its longstanding conferences with its eight Regional Financial Communities and the Worldwide Convention on the Nice Lakes Area (ICGLR), the Sub-regional Arms Management Mechanism (SARCOM), and RECSA to generate a greater understanding of the size and scope of materiel loss. That is one thing the AU’s “Silencing the Weapons” initiative could lead on, together with assessing the problem of securing heavy weapons programs.

Gaining higher management of those deadly belongings will concurrently contribute to more practical safety operations on the continent whereas diminishing a key useful resource sustaining militant teams.

Eric G. Berman is director of the Safeguarding Safety Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative and a Visiting Scholar at Northwestern College’s Program of African Research. He was previously the director of the Small Arms Survey.

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